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CIVIL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
H. TIMOTHY LOVELACE, JR.†
ABSTRACT
During the early 1960s, government officials in the U.S. Department
of State grappled with the following quandary: How could the United
States shape and lead a racially diverse world while still denying rights
to Black Americans domestically? One way the State Department set
out to resolve this disconnect was through diplomacy and negotiations
at the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which crafted the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination. Although extensive documentation exists on the
exchanges between the Sub-Commission, the State Department, and the
U.S. civil rights community, existing literature fails to examine these
rich exchanges in sufficient detail. This Article explores how the United
States shaped international human rights regimes through the SubCommission, and, in turn, how international affairs shaped the U.S.
civil rights movement.
One underexplored aspect of the interplay between the U.S. civil
rights movement and the international human rights regime is how the
State Department interfaced with the Sub-Commission. By exploring
the exchanges between the two high-profile civil rights lawyers the State
Department sent to negotiate with the Sub-Commission and other
actors at the United Nations, this Article highlights the tension between
these lawyers’ values and the U.S. diplomatic agenda. This tension in
turn magnifies how the U.S. civil rights movement and the international
human rights regime shaped one another.
The history of how the U.S. delegation sought to imbue the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination with U.S. values remains central to this Article’s
discussion. And, at the heart of this contribution was the importation
of the state action doctrine. Thus, the doctrine that had vexed civil rights
activists’ domestic litigation for decades became enshrined in the
international human rights regime. This Article explores the role that
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the state action doctrine played in the reciprocal relationship between
the U.S. civil rights movement and the international human rights
regime.
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INTRODUCTION
In late 1963, the U.S. Department of State was preparing for
renewed international criticism of the Jim Crow South.1 In November
of that year, the U.N. General Assembly gave “absolute priority” to
preparing an international treaty to end racism.2 The General
Assembly tasked the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (“Sub-Commission”) with
preparing the first draft of this binding legal document, entitled the
“International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

1. See Letter from Morris Abram, U.N. Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and
Prot. of Minorities, to Ivan Allen, Jr., Mayor, City of Atlanta, Ga. (Oct. 23, 1963) (on file with
author) (describing the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities visiting Atlanta: “As you know, the purpose of the visit is not to demonstrate that the
South is without problems but to show that places like Atlanta are doing something constructive
in spite of the encrusted past . . . .”).
2. G.A. Res. 1906 (XVIII), at 38 (Nov. 20, 1963).
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Discrimination” (“ICERD” or “Convention”), which would become
the world’s most comprehensive treaty on race.3
The Sub-Commission was well-positioned to produce the primary
draft of the Convention for several reasons. First, the Sub-Commission,
pursuant to its mandate, was a body exclusively dedicated to studying
issues of inequality throughout the world and offering
recommendations for remedying those denials of human rights.4
Second, U.N. rules stated that the Sub-Commission’s members were to
be “experts” on issues of inequality operating in their individual
capacities, not simply representatives of their home states.5 Finally, the
Sub-Commission’s members, as experts, were only authorized to
examine general patterns of discrimination around the world rather
than offer country-specific criticisms or remedies.6 The SubCommission, in other words, was designed to advance the idea that
human rights were to be above politics, neutral, and universal in
application.7 The United Nations hoped the arrangement would
minimize power politics and, in turn, provide broad, global solutions to
problems facing diverse societies.8 Nonetheless, the Sub-Commission’s
foundation of expert autonomy was often a legal fiction; the experts
were appointed by their respective national governments and many
operated as state agents.9 Using these experts, states could pursue their

3. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); G.A. Res.
1906 (XVIII), at 37–38 (Nov. 20, 1963) (requesting the Sub-Commission’s assistance in drafting
the Convention and showing the hierarchy within the U.N. system which led to the SubCommission producing the first draft of the Convention); see also NATAN LERNER, THE U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 4–6 (1980)
(explaining that the Sub-Commission produced the first draft of the Convention).
4. Asbjørn Eide, The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 211, 211
(Philip Alston ed., 1992).
5. See John P. Humphrey, The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, 62 AM. J. INT’L L. 869, 869 (1968).
6. Eide, supra note 4, at 226–27.
7. Id. The idea was to mitigate political dynamics in hopes of achieving broader remedies
against racial discrimination than would otherwise be possible through the traditional means of
country-based negotiations. See Humphrey, supra note 5 (explaining that the Sub-Commission
was to be composed of independent experts which would allow it to be free from the pressures of
their respective governments).
8. See Humphrey, supra note 5 (describing how being composed of independent experts
rather than government representatives would allow the Sub-Commission to develop solutions
not available to political representatives).
9. Id. at 871.
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national interests under the guise of human rights promotion. To be
sure, at times during the Sub-Commission’s deliberations, the body
evinced real concern for those facing racial discrimination.10 Yet, at
other times, racial politics were simply power politics. Nations used
this forum to discredit their ideological enemies, gain allies,
rehabilitate their foreign reputations, and spread their visions for race
relations abroad.11 And in many instances, these diverse motivations
for human rights work dovetailed in the Convention debates.12
Thus, contrary to the body’s internal rules,13 the Sub-Commission
often transformed into a forum where foreign officials shamed the
body’s U.S. members for proclaiming the United States’ commitment
to democracy abroad while denying Black Americans democracy at
home.14 Such outward criticism harmed U.S. foreign policy interests
because U.S. policymakers understood the United States’ position in
the Cold War increasingly depended upon its ability to influence
decolonizing and newly independent countries.15 The persistence of
U.S. racism thus proved to be a liability in the international arena.16
Many at the United Nations questioned the United States’ fitness to
lead a racially diverse world given its failure to ensure racial equality
within its borders.17
However, when the U.N. General Assembly requested that the
Sub-Commission draft the Convention, State Department officials saw
an opportunity and seized the moment. Those officials charged two of
the United States’ foremost civil rights lawyers, Morris Abram and
Clyde Ferguson, to help develop a U.S. draft of the Convention for the

10.
11.

Id.
See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–1955, at 76–77 (2003).
12. See, e.g., MORRIS B. ABRAM, THE DAY IS SHORT 151–54 (1982) (providing a firsthand
account of politicking and disagreements among countries and delegates at the Convention).
13. Eide, supra note 4.
14. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 106–07; ABRAM, supra note 12, at 152–53; MARY
L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
43–44 (2000) [hereinafter DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS].
15. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 6.
16. See id. at 6–7.
17. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 106–07; see also DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 6–7 (illustrating that this criticism of U.S. democracy was part of a
broader geopolitical phenomenon).
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Sub-Commission’s debates.18 For Abram and Ferguson, the U.N.
project offered them a matchless opportunity as well, and the effort
would create a powerful platform for both men to advance ideas of
equality, freedom, and justice under law.19
And when the State Department developed drafting instructions
for Abram and Ferguson, the instructions were resoundingly clear:
“On the development of text,” the State Department’s guidance paper
read, “the approach should be along [the] lines of the ‘equal protection’
concept in our 14th Amendment.”20 For the State Department,
incorporating U.S. constitutional principles into the U.N. Convention
presented many benefits. First, if the Convention mirrored the
principles in constitutional law, the United States could credibly argue
that it was at the vanguard of racial progress.21 Second, State
Department officials hoped to persuade newly independent countries
and the Sub-Commission to embrace U.S. constitutional values more
broadly. Moreover, the closer the Convention’s language was to the
Constitution, the fewer conflicting obligations the United States would
encounter if it were to adopt the Convention. In an ideal world, the
United States would need no reservations, understandings, or
declarations to adopt the Convention.22
18. See Letter from Rachel C. Nason, Hum. Rts. Officer, Off. of Int’l Econ. & Soc. Affs.,
U.S. Dep’t of State, to Morris Abram, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind & Garrison (Dec. 20, 1963) (on file
with MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 9) [hereinafter 1963 Nason-Abram Letter]; Letter
from Morris B. Abram to Dr. Clyde Ferguson, Dean, How. Univ. L. Sch. (Dec. 30, 1963) (on file
with MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 9) [hereinafter Abram-Ferguson Letter] (showing
communication between Abram and Ferguson on the draft); Letter from Rachel Nason to Morris
Abram, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (Jan. 10, 1964) (on file with MARBL, Abram
Papers, Box 94, Folder 9) [hereinafter 1964 Nason-Abram letter] (providing an example of
collaboration between Abram and Ferguson).
19. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–51; Clyde Ferguson, International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? 41, 41–43 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981)
[hereinafter Ferguson, CERD].
20. Guidance Paper, Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination 4 (on file with MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 3) [hereinafter Guidance
Paper].
21. See, e.g., ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–51 (explaining how he conceived of his role as
one that represents U.S. interests on the Sub-Commission and relies on U.S. legal principles to
draft international treaties); Guidance Paper, supra note 20, at 4–5 (“Provisions in line with the
US Constitution and law should be supported on their merits.”).
22. See Ferguson, CERD, supra note 19, at 41–42 (explaining that, given the active U.S.
participation in drafting the Convention and that the Convention expressed U.S. values, the
United States did not need to enter the reservations, understandings, and declarations proposed
by the Executive branch).
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However, for Abram and Ferguson, the goal of transplanting U.S.
law into the Convention created a paradox. Abram and Ferguson were
cold warriors and firmly believed in America’s democratic potential.23
Yet, exporting U.S. democracy abroad would also mean exporting
American problems. Despite the Fourteenth Amendment’s great
promise, if Abram and Ferguson were successful in grafting the Equal
Protection Clause onto the Convention, they would also saddle the
Convention with the state action doctrine. That doctrine limited the
application of the clause only to government entities and, in turn, put
private discrimination beyond constitutional reach.24 The doctrine had
long stymied racial progress in the United States.25 Thus, while other
experts’ Convention proposals could likely achieve greater protection
against racial discrimination,26 Abram and Ferguson’s acceptance of
those proposals would fail to promote the United States’ ideals and
democracy abroad.
Even today, the vestiges of this paradox remain.27 More than fifty
years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ended most formal racial
discrimination, the distinction between private and public
discrimination is a cornerstone of the U.S. government’s approach to
domestic and international law.28 Where no redress exists for parties

23. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–51 (describing how, in the 1960s, he perceived his
diplomatic work as an “opportunity to flaunt the glorious difference between [U.S.] society and
that of . . . the Soviet Union”). For expressions of Ferguson’s patriotism and belief in the promise
of U.S. democracy, see Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., The Nature and Dimensions of Human
Rights in the United States, 11 HOW. L.J. 452, 453, 460–61 (1965) [hereinafter Ferguson, Nature
and Dimensions] (describing the civil rights movement as “the third American revolution” and
hoping that all in the United States could “share in the American dream”).
24. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4, 17–18, 25 (1883) (declaring that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1875).
25. See id.; John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the “State Action” Limit on the
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 855 (1966) (describing how this publicprivate distinction facilitated racial discrimination in the private sphere and arguing that the Court
should replace the state action doctrine in order to fulfill the promise of Reconstruction and
secure racial equality in public life).
26. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
27. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 9 (2013), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/2108
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BK6-GSMY].
28. See id. See generally CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1985) (recounting the history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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with private discrimination claims, the U.S. government continues to
insist that neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor international
instruments impose an obligation to prohibit and punish purely private
conduct.29 Thus, the debates at the Convention’s drafting continue to
shape the debates over both domestic and international norms
regarding racial discrimination today.
But despite the ties between the Sub-Commission, State
Department, and the civil rights community, the relationship between
the U.S. civil rights movement and the Convention’s legislative history
remains underexplored.30 This Article contributes to a growing
historiography and corrects a common misperception that the United
States has not contributed considerably to international human rights
regimes.31 The history of the Convention demonstrates that
international affairs not only helped to shape the U.S. civil rights
movement but that the U.S. civil rights movement also helped to shape

29. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 27. The United States’ position contrasts with the
shadow report the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”)
submitted to the CERD Committee. NAACP, SHADOW REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CONCERNING THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION 43 (2014), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/
USA/INT_CERD_NGO_USA_17809_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8VZ-VQD7] (arguing that the
United States should remedy residential segregation and housing discrimination caused by public
and private actors pursuant to U.S. civil rights law and its CERD obligations).
30. In fact, one prominent human rights scholar, David P. Forsythe, has gone as far as to
claim that “the United States, despite its dominant power, has not been the major shaper of
community standards or international regimes on human rights.” David P. Forsythe, Human
Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 435, 435 (1990). It is also
critical to note that the terms “civil rights” and “human rights” were hotly contested in the early
and mid-1960s. During the Convention debates, Clyde Ferguson conceded, “I know that
internationally what constitutes human rights is still quite difficult of definition, quite difficult of
articulation. Domestically what constitutes the Civil Rights which we use almost daily in our
dialogue is equally difficult of statement or articulation or even in some cases, of analysis.”
Ferguson, Nature and Dimensions, supra note 23, at 452. These definitional problems were
present even at the founding of the United Nations. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
For the sake of readability, this Article uses the term “civil rights” to refer to the protections then
offered under the U.S. Constitution and the term “human rights” to refer to the protections
offered under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
31. For examples of this historiographic shift recognizing the United States’ role in
international law, see generally CAROL ANDERSON, BOURGEOIS RADICALS: THE NAACP AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR COLONIAL LIBERATION, 1941–1960 (2014); ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A
NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD: AMERICA’S VISION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2005); MARY ANN
GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
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international human rights law. This untold story of racial diplomacy—
the collaboration between the State Department, Abram, and
Ferguson—illustrates how racial liberals became key components of
U.S. statecraft during the Cold War, exposing great tensions within the
global freedom struggle and revealing the diversity of strategies used
to end Jim Crow.
This Article expands the scholarship on civil rights lawyers and
activists’ efforts to forge transnational connections and extend the
movement’s geopolitical reach.32 The Convention has a vast
geopolitical expanse: There are now 182 parties to the Convention.33
Scores of countries have domesticated the Convention.34
Intergovernmental organizations have developed new human rights
mechanisms to assist with the implementation of the Convention.35
And individuals throughout the world use the Convention to seek legal

32. Some foreign leaders were deeply impressed by the hard-earned victories of U.S. civil
rights lawyers, and these officials drew extensively from movement lawyers’ experiences and
insights to remake world constitutions. The Kenyan government, for example, commissioned
Thurgood Marshall to help draft the country’s independence constitution. For a rich account of
Marshall’s diplomacy in Kenya, see generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, EXPORTING AMERICAN
DREAMS: THURGOOD MARSHALL’S AFRICAN JOURNEY (Princeton Univ. Press 2011) (2008).
Despite the proliferation of civil rights scholarship, the movement’s larger-than-life
personalities—men like Thurgood Marshall—dominate the literature on civil rights lawyering.
See generally, e.g., WIL HAYGOOD, SHOWDOWN: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME
COURT NOMINATION THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2015) (detailing Marshall’s Supreme Court
confirmation hearings); CHARLES L. ZELDEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: RACE, RIGHTS, AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR A MORE PERFECT UNION (2013) (providing a concise biography of
Thurgood Marshall); LARRY S. GIBSON, YOUNG THURGOOD: THE MAKING OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE (2012) (examining Marshall’s childhood and rise to civil rights stardom);
GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND BOYS, AND
THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA (2012) (chronicling Marshall’s fight against Jim Crow in a case
involving four Black men wrongly accused of raping a white woman); THURGOOD
MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES (Mark
V. Tushnet ed., 2001) (offering examples of Thurgood Marshall’s speeches, arguments, and
opinions); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998)
(providing a biography of Thurgood Marshall); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991 (1997) (examining
Marshall’s judicial career); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 (1994) (examining Marshall’s legal career at
the NAACP).
33. Status of the ICERD, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/
C46Y-A2SW].
34. See id.
35. PATRICK THORNBERRY, THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY 35 (2016).

LOVELACE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

CIVIL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS

4/16/2022 6:46 PM

1857

redress in national and international courts.36 But just as the U.S.
experts used U.S. constitutional law to spread a vision for democracy,
they also spread the limitations of U.S. constitutional law.37 This
Article seeks to provide a more in-depth understanding of the
geopolitical context within which the experts drafted the Convention
and, in turn, highlight how that context continues to shape domestic
and international debates on racism today.
Part I of this Article provides background on the Convention and
explores the underlying political currents going into the Convention
debates. Part II details the United States’ strategy to explain U.S.
racism to the human rights community while establishing the federal
government as the world’s authority on ensuring racial progress. The
Part also details the relationship between the U.S. experts and the State
Department and outlines how both parties collaborated to achieve
their unique goals. Part III chronicles the Convention debates
themselves, illuminating how the United States actively worked to
export the state action doctrine to ensure that the Convention
accorded with U.S. constitutional principles. Part IV documents how
the U.S. experts justified their stance on the Convention to the State
Department and how their perspectives fit neatly within liberal
thought. Finally, this Article concludes with three lessons from the
history of the Convention that remain relevant today.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION AND THE UNITED
STATES’ INTEREST IN THE CONVENTION DEBATES
The push to create a comprehensive treaty on discrimination
began with the rise of decolonization and a new wave of anti-Semitism
in Europe in 1959.38 Originally, the United Nations planned to author
a treaty that addressed “all manifestations and practices of racial,
religious and national hatred,”39 but members of the bourgeoning
Afro-Asian bloc moved to separate the treaty into two: one treaty on

36. See id. at 472–83.
37. See supra notes 20–28 and accompanying text.
38. See Ofra Friesel, Race Versus Religion in the Making of the International Convention
Against Racial Discrimination, 1965, 32 LAW & HIST. REV. 351, 361–62 (2014).
39. G.A. Res. 1510 (XV), at 22 (Dec. 12, 1960). Jointly addressing religious and racial
discrimination would be consistent with the other major documents, like the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, that the United Nations had produced at that point. Friesel, supra
note 38, at 352–53.
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racial discrimination and a second treaty on religious intolerance.40
Given the ideological fissures at the United Nations, the Afro-Asian
bloc argued that incorporating a ban on religious intolerance in the
treaty would delay the treaty’s adoption.41 The Soviet Union, most
notably, aimed to avoid all U.N. examinations of its long and
continuing anti-Semitic practices.42 The country’s U.N. delegates
routinely refused to even acknowledge Soviet anti-Semitism.43 Many
Third World representatives feared bundling religious and racial
discrimination would complicate and delay the passage of any treaty.44
Indeed, those African and Asian countries were still reeling from the
legacies of European colonialism.45 Representatives in the Afro-Asian
bloc, in particular, tended to prioritize ending racial discrimination and
recognized how the United Nations’ efforts to end racial discrimination
would become collateral damage to the geopolitical tensions
surrounding religious discrimination.46 The U.N. General Assembly
eventually ceded to the Afro-Asian bloc’s prioritization of racial
discrimination and placed race and religion into separate human rights
instruments.47
The U.N. General Assembly then tasked the Sub-Commission
with drafting the primary language for the instruments.48 The SubCommission began its process by authoring declarations on each
topic.49 These declarations, as the term indicates, did not establish legal
obligations on state signatories. They were instead nonbinding

40. Friesel, supra note 38, at 375.
41. Id. at 354.
42. Id. at 364–65.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 375–76.
45. Id. at 362.
46. Id. at 353–54.
47. Id. at 376; see G.A. Res. 1780 (XVII), at 32–33 (Dec. 7, 1962) (calling for “a draft
declaration” and “a draft convention” on “the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination”);
G.A. Res. 1781 (XVII), at 33 (Dec. 7, 1962) (calling for “a draft declaration” and “a draft
convention” on “the elimination of . . . religious intolerance”).
48. See G.A. Res. 1780, supra note 47, at 32–33; G.A. Res. 1781, supra note 47, at 33; see
also THORNBERRY, supra note 35, at 30–31 (discussing how “[t]he Sub-Commission took up the
task . . . of preparing the Convention”).
49. See G.A. Res. 1780, supra note 47, at 32–33 (calling for “a draft declaration” and a “draft
convention” on “the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination”); G.A. Res. 1781, supra
note 47, at 33 (calling for “a draft declaration and a draft convention on the elimination of all
forms of religious [discrimination]”); David Keane, Addressing the Aggravated Meeting Points of
Race and Religion, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 367, 373–81 (2006).
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expressions declaring the ideal standards for all countries to follow.50
Once the Sub-Commission completed each aspirational document and
the General Assembly ratified a particular declaration, the SubCommission could begin drafting the corresponding convention by
relying on the ratified declaration as a guide.51 Each convention, as a
treaty and pursuant to international law, would then create binding
legal obligations on its state parties.52
The United States was embarrassed before the human rights
community during the debates on the U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“Declaration”),
the precursor to the Convention. Article 2 of the Declaration
proclaimed, “No State, institution, group[,] or individual shall make
any discrimination whatsoever in matters of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the treatment of persons, groups of persons[,]
or institutions on the ground of race, colour[,] or ethnic origin.”53 The
provision cast a much wider net than the Fourteenth Amendment
because the state action doctrine prevented the Equal Protection
Clause from reaching wholly private discrimination.54 Despite the
United States’ rhetoric, its Constitution could not reach all forms of
racial discrimination under the Declaration.55
State Department officials recognized that the Convention
debates offered new opportunities for the United States to counter the
Eastern bloc’s advances on the Sub-Commission.56 The Convention,

50. See Keane, supra note 49, at 368–74 (explaining the different historical trajectories and
statuses of these racial and religious instruments); ANNE-MARIE MOONEY COTTER, RACE
MATTERS: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS OF RACE DISCRIMINATION 41 (2006)
(“[T]here are several international declarations which express the international community’s
aspirations to eliminate racial discrimination.”).
51. See Keane, supra note 49, at 374. This process was the traditional practice. It was used
for the preparation of the treaty on racial discrimination. Id. This process was proposed for the
treaty on religious intolerance, but that process ultimately turned out different. See id. at 377–80.
52. Id. at 368, 382. After the Sub-Commission completed each draft, the draft then went to
the Commission on Human Rights, the Third Committee, and ultimately the General Assembly
for additional debate. See LERNER, supra note 3, at 4–6.
53. G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII), art. 2, at 36 (Nov. 20, 1963).
54. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
55. Memorandum from Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Gen. Couns., to Mrs. Rachel Nason,
Off. of Econ. & Soc. Affs., Dep’t of State (Sept. 18, 1963) (on file with National Archives, College
Park, Md., Record Group 84, Office of Economic and Social Affairs, Dev. Econ. Am. Reds to
Discrim., Box 86, Folder Discrimination: Race—1960–63).
56. See Keane, supra note 50, at 371–77 (explaining the processes leading to drafting the
Convention and the differences between the Declaration and Convention). Morris Abram also

LOVELACE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1860

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/16/2022 6:46 PM

[Vol. 71:1849

unlike the Declaration, would be legally binding upon state parties.57
Now, with an opening to redefine racial discrimination, the State
Department embarked upon a strategy to translate its vision of equal
protection into a binding treaty.58
II. A U.S. PLAN FOR THE WORLD
The United States’ strategy for the Convention debates offered a
lesson in managing a racial revolution. The State Department
developed a “civil rights as human rights” approach to the
negotiations.59 It first required that the United States declare that it was
committed to serving as the world’s leader in the struggle for equal
protection under law. “It can be pointed out that our Constitution is
consistent with the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights], which
has been generally accepted as an international norm,” the State
Department’s instructions for the Convention negotiations read.60
State Department officials contended that it was not U.S. values that
had been the source of the nation’s race problems; rather, it was lapses
in the commitment to those values, particularly in the U.S. South, that
had caused race problems.61 The State Department also needed

highlighted this substantial distinction between the Declaration and the Convention early in the
Convention debates. Although the Declaration inspired portions of the U.S. draft, Abram
reminded his colleagues “that a convention was not the same thing as a declaration. A declaration
stated principles, put hopes and aspirations into words, and set the objectives to be reached.” U.N.
ESCOR, Sub-Comm’n on the Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, 16th Sess.,
408th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.408 (Jan. 14, 1964) [hereinafter Sub-Comm’n 408
mtg.]. However, for Abram, there was a legal difference that was key to understanding the
significance of the newest round of Sub-Commission negotiations. Abram maintained, “Moral
principles . . . no matter how noble, could not all be incorporated in international law. The object
of a Convention should be to formulate rules of conduct common to all civilized societies.” Id.
57. See Keane, supra note 50 at 368, 374–77 (noting that the Convention “is both specific
and binding on states parties,” in contrast to the nonbinding Declaration).
58. See Sub-Comm’n 408 mtg., supra note 56, at 6.
59. Not only did the State Department select two civil rights lawyers to also work as human
rights lawyers, but the State Department was also attempting to incorporate U.S. civil rights law
and policy into the Convention. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Guidance
Paper, supra note 20, at 4 (“On the development of text, . . . the approach should be along [the]
lines of the ‘equal protection’ concept in our 14th Amendment.”).
60. Guidance Paper, supra note 20, at 5.
61. See, e.g., Press Release, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the
United Nations, Statement on the Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination 3 (Oct. 1, 1963) (on file with MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 1)
(describing the United States’ treatment of Black people as often deviating from the principles in
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members on the Sub-Commission to represent U.S. interests during the
Convention debates. Morris Abram and Clyde Ferguson were the
perfect fit. The esteemed lawyers gave legitimacy to the U.S. narrative
and helped promote domestic values globally. For Abram and
Ferguson, representing U.S. interests presented a rare opportunity to
leverage the global stage for progress both at home and abroad.62 The
plan created new opportunities to counter foreign criticism of U.S. race
relations, enlarge the United States’ sphere of influence at the United
Nations, and reposition the nation in discussions of global racial
progress—all without offending the U.S. Constitution.63
This part introduces the State Department’s strategy and discusses
why U.S. officials believed that selecting a diverse pair of SubCommission members would help the United States execute its
strategy. The part then turns to the U.S. racial experts’ backgrounds
and aspirations. It outlines how Abram and Ferguson hoped to use
their experiences and positions within the state to advance U.S. foreign
interests and promote their own visions for domestic and international
race reform.
A. South of Freedom: How Southern “Exceptionalism” Shaped U.S.
Diplomacy on Race
In many ways, 1963 appeared to be the wrong year for the State
Department to act so brazenly. Birmingham, Alabama’s high-pressure
fire hoses, snarling police dogs, and dead children haunted the
country’s conscience.64 More than two hundred thousand citizens
marched on Washington to remind the world that one hundred years
after the Emancipation Proclamation, “the Negro live[d] on a lonely
island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity.”65
the Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights and declaring that despite some setbacks the
United States now was attempting to live up to its heritage).
62. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 154; Ferguson, CERD, supra note 19, at 41–42.
63. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–51; Guidance Paper, supra note 20, at 4–5.
64. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 170; see also Stevenson, supra
note 61, at 5 (“The recent murder of four innocent Negro children in a church has shocked and
sickened us all.”).
65. March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/
articles/march-on-washington.htm#:~:text=It%20was%20the%20largest%20gathering,from%2
0all%20over%20the%20country [https://perma.cc/C6US-XWAK]; Martin Luther King, Jr., I
Have a Dream, Speech at the Lincoln Memorial (Aug. 28, 1963), in A CALL TO CONSCIENCE:
THE LANDMARK SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 81, 81 (Clayborne Carson & Kris
Shepard eds., 2001).
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African diplomats repeatedly complained to the State Department and
their home governments after they were Jim Crowed out of housing in
Washington, D.C.66 These diplomats faced additional humiliation on
the drive from the nation’s capital to U.N. headquarters. On Route 40,
the highway that connected Washington and New York, diplomats of
color were routinely denied service in Maryland’s public
accommodations.67 America’s race problems appeared not to be
temporary lapses in democratic governance. Racial domination
seemed to be a defining feature of U.S. democracy. Why should a
government that had failed to stamp out racism within its own borders
be charged with directing the world’s march against bigotry? Outright
denial, scapegoating, or dismissing the significance of the United
States’ dilemma would undermine the nation’s credibility during the
Convention debates, State Department officials reasoned.68 A United
States perceived as lukewarm or even hostile to civil rights progress
would struggle to endear the human rights community to its interests
and values. Federal officials insisted that their country, flaws and all,
had the world’s best and most effective legal framework for ending
racial discrimination.69 If the United States’ conception of civil rights
was indeed the highest expression of human rights, as federal officials
maintained, the United States had to powerfully convey the great
prospects for racial progress under U.S. constitutionalism.
The State Department’s strategy demanded new levels of
transparency, seriousness, and visible leadership on the race question.
Nothing demonstrated this portion of their plan more than
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson’s address to the U.N. General
Assembly’s Social, Cultural, and Humanitarian Committee in late

66. See Michael Krenn, The Unwelcome Mat: African Diplomats in Washington, D.C.,
During the Kennedy Years, in WINDOW ON FREEDOM: RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 1945–1988, at 163, 165–69 (Brenda Gayle Plummer ed., 2003); Renee Romano, No
Diplomatic Immunity: African Diplomats, the State Department, and Civil Rights, 1961–1964, 87
J. AM. HIST. 546, 551–53 (2000).
67. See CHARLES E. COBB JR., ON THE ROAD TO FREEDOM: A GUIDED TOUR OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS TRAIL 40 (2008); Krenn, supra note 66, at 170; Romano, supra note 66, at 551–52;
Harold R. Isaacs, American Race Relations and the United States Image in World Affairs, in RACE
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 260, 265–66 (Michael L. Krenn ed., 1998).
68. See Romano, supra note 66, at 546–48 (noting that the Kennedy administration took
more forceful actions to fight segregation after the administration recognized the nation’s passive
approach to outlawing segregation harmed its foreign policy interests).
69. See, e.g., ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–53.
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1963.70 The U.S. delegate assigned to the committee was scheduled to
address the group of representatives from all 111 U.N. delegations, but
Stevenson, the senior U.S. representative to the United Nations,
usurped the scheduled delegate’s slot.71 In his address, Stevenson
emphasized the United States’ commitment to racial justice while
acknowledging the nation’s shortcomings.72 Stevenson discussed how,
only weeks earlier, a time-delayed dynamite blast rocked
Birmingham’s Sixteenth Street Baptist Church and killed four young
Black children: Addie Mae Collins, Denise McNair, Carole Robertson,
and Cynthia Wesley.73 In a region where many citizens prized
religiosity, the Ku Klux Klan’s callous attack on a civil rights sanctuary
after the morning’s Sunday school lesson epitomized the United States’
deep hypocrisies.74 “Such a crime impairs human freedom not only
here,” Stevenson lamented, “but throughout the world.”75
Many reporters and U.N. delegations were astonished by the
ambassador’s frank and painfully honest commentary. The New York
Times described Stevenson’s remarks as “an uncommonly candid
recital of the racial struggle in the United States. . . . Rarely in the
United Nations do member states talk about their internal problems,

70. Adlai Backs U.N.’s Race Statement, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1963, at A23; Stevenson, supra
note 61. Stevenson made this unusual and significant move due to the growing criticisms of U.S.
race relations and the broader, powerful calls at the United Nations to address global racism.
Kathleen Teltsch, Stevenson Gives Pledge on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1963, at 24; see Adlai
Backs U.N.’s Race Statement, supra.
71. Teltsch, supra note 70; see also Adlai Backs U.N.’s Race Statement, supra note 70
(“[Stevenson] said he was making the speech personally instead of the regular U.S. delegate to
the committee because racial justice ha[d] been a major interest of his for many years.”).
Stevenson served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from 1961 until 1965. Harlan
Cleveland, On a World-Scale Roller Coaster: Adlai Stevenson at the UN, 1961–65, in ADLAI
STEVENSON’S LASTING LEGACY 97, 97 (Alvin Leibling ed., 2007).
72. See Stevenson, supra note 61, at 5. Stevenson acknowledged racism in U.S. cities like
Jackson, Mississippi; Little Rock, Arkansas; and Birmingham, Alabama, but he then reframed
the United States’ response as one that demonstrated the nation was attempting to uproot racism.
Id. He declared, “The mature reaction of world opinion to recent events in the American South
shows that people around the world recognize the difference between a country which is having
racial trouble because it is unwilling to make progress and a country which is having racial trouble
because it is making progress.” Id.
73. Id. (“The recent murder of four innocent Negro children in a church has shocked and
sickened us all.”); CAROLYN MAULL MCKINSTRY & DENISE GEORGE, WHILE THE WORLD
WATCHED: A BIRMINGHAM BOMBING SURVIVOR COMES OF AGE DURING THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, at xiii–ix (2011); THERLEE GIPSON, ALABAMA BLACKS LAST STRAW 44 (2019).
74. See MCKINSTRY & GEORGE, supra note 73, at ix.
75. Stevenson, supra note 61, at 5.
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and even more rarely do they do so with such open self-criticism.”76 But
Stevenson’s candor was strategic. Newswires crisscrossed the globe,
circulating sensational portraits of racial strife in the United States, and
the ambassador used this moment to reconceptualize the nation’s wellknown racial struggles.77 Rather than assume a purely defensive
posture, Stevenson asserted that the United States’ racial struggles
were evidence of true progress.78 His reframing of the United States’
dilemma attempted to capture the emotionalism of the moment,
demands for increased U.S. transparency, and his firm belief in the
redemptive power of U.S. values.79
The State Department’s approach to race required U.S. diplomats
to explain away the nation’s race problems through American
exceptionalism. According to this progressive narrative, the United
States had been a trailblazer in the world’s struggle for liberty for
nearly two hundred years.80 The civil rights movement was the last
phase in its march toward human rights for all.81 Thus, the U.S.
delegation framed the nation’s racial history in a narrative paradigm
familiar to the human rights community, holding the civil rights
movement as the final of three U.S. revolutions.82 In this grand
narrative, the first revolution was the battle for independence; the
second, the Civil War; the third, the nonviolent civil rights movement.83
With this framing, the United States hoped to leave experts on the SubCommission with the impression that it placed “the highest priority on
the fight against discrimination everywhere.”84 This evolutionary logic

76. Teltsch, supra note 70.
77. Id.; Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62
(1988) [hereinafter, Dudziak, Cold War Imperative].
78. Stevenson, supra note 61, at 5.
79. See id. at 3, 5.
80. See id. at 1.
81. Id.
82. Id.; see Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights,
42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201, 202–04 (2001) (describing the flawed “three-dimensional” conception
often adopted by human rights advocates). Professor Makau Mutua’s deeply influential article,
Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, discusses how human rights
advocates often rely on troubling progress narratives to justify their projects. See id. (discussing
the “troubling rhetoric” of the human rights movement and the three dimensions of the
“fundamentally Eurocentric” human rights narrative).
83. Stevenson, supra note 61, at 1.
84. Id.
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was standard fare for U.S. cold warriors interested in race reform and
fit neatly within the Convention debates.
The State Department’s strategy also borrowed from the trope of
“Southern exceptionalism.” This myth regionalized U.S. racism,
making the nation’s race problem, at its core, a Southern problem.85
The United States highlighted cities notorious for their racial clashes
like Little Rock, Arkansas; Birmingham, Alabama; Albany, Georgia;
Cambridge, Maryland; and Jackson, Mississippi, that were all below
the Mason-Dixon line.86 This presentation of U.S. race relations
conveniently sidestepped the national realities of white supremacy and
ignored the fierce and growing movement activism in cities like
Detroit, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; and Los Angeles, California.87
The trope of “Southern exceptionalism” also purported to explain
federalism’s relationship to racial justice.88 Racial subordination
occurred in the United States, so the argument went, because many
Southern state governments invoked states’ rights to impede racial
progress. It was federal officials, pursuant to this binary line of
reasoning, who brought racial modernity to their backward brethren.
Ambassador Stevenson invoked this familiar binary during his speech
to the Social, Cultural, and Humanitarian Committee:
[I]f anyone is disposed to doubt the resolve of my government to
enforce the Supreme Court decision on equal rights in education, I
would remind him that a short time ago, thousands of Federal troops
supported the right of a single individual [James Meredith] to sit in
the classrooms of the University of Mississippi. 89

This binary tale left no room for federal ineptitude, complicity, or
cowardice in the campus desegregation story.90 The federal
85. Id. at 5. For more on “Southern exceptionalism,” see Matthew D. Lassiter & Joseph
Crespino, Introduction: The End of Southern History to THE MYTH OF SOUTHERN
EXCEPTIONALISM 5–6 (Matthew D. Lassiter & Joseph Crespino eds., 2009).
86. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 61, at 5.
87. JEANNE F. THEOHARIS, A MORE BEAUTIFUL AND TERRIBLE HISTORY: THE USES AND
MISUSES OF CIVIL RIGHTS HISTORY 63–65 (2018); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF
LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH, at xiii–xiv (2008);
Jeanne Theoharis, Introduction to FREEDOM NORTH: BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLES OUTSIDE
THE SOUTH, 1940–1980, at 1, 1–3 (Jeanne Theoharis & Komozi Woodard eds., 2003).
88. For other insights on the political implications of invoking “Southern exceptionalism,”
see generally THE MYTH OF SOUTHERN EXCEPTIONALISM, supra note 85.
89. Stevenson, supra note 61, at 5.
90. See RICHARD D. MAHONEY, SONS & BROTHERS: THE DAYS OF JACK AND BOBBY
KENNEDY 182–89 (1999).
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government was James Meredith’s and, by extension, the Black race’s
savior. Its machinery would only be mobilized to support the country’s
commitment to destroying racial discrimination. Southern state
governments were the problem, and the federal government had the
solution.
B. A New Symbiosis: Morris Abram and Clyde Ferguson Change the
Face of Racial Diplomacy
Legal concepts do not travel by themselves. Humans circulated
ideas about human rights law, and in the case of racial diplomacy, it
was particularly critical to note who circulated the ideas.91 Jim Crow
undercut the United States’ ability to establish itself as the world’s true
race leader, and so its State Department sought to appoint experts who
could credibly further U.S. interests during the Convention debates.
Morris Abram and Clyde Ferguson provided exactly that, both
descriptively and substantively.92 Yet the relationship was symbiotic.
Abram and Ferguson saw an opportunity in their appointments to
leverage the global stage to promote progress both abroad and at
home.93 Thus, an extraordinary, mutually beneficial relationship
formed that would play a crucial role in shaping the landscape of both
civil and human rights.
Morris Abram was born in Fitzgerald, Georgia, to a Jewish
immigrant from Romania.94 Fitzgerald was a Protestant hamlet tucked
in Georgia’s Black Belt, and there, Abram began to understand the
tension between the U.S. Constitution and the practices of
segregation.95 Abram later graduated summa cum laude from the
University of Georgia “and received his law degree from the
University of Chicago.”96 Abram also received a Rhodes Scholarship,
91. For more on how ideas flow across national borders, see Daniel T. Rodgers, Paths in the
Social History of Ideas, in THE WORLDS OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 307, 307–08
(Joel Isaac et al. eds., 2017).
92. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–52 (discussing how Abram conceptualized his
platform on the Sub-Commission); ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CLARENCE CLYDE FERGUSON, JR.,
DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW: THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION
CASES 11–12 (1957) (explaining how Cold War politics could spur domestic civil rights reform).
94. ABRAM, supra note 12, at 9–10.
95. See id. at 10, 47–48.
96. Lawyer, Educator, Civil Rights Activist, Jewish Community Leader, Educator &
Diplomat, Morris B. Abram 4 (on file with MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 22, Folder 12)
[hereinafter Abram, Extended Biography].
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but he could not immediately attend Oxford University as World War
II intervened.97 Abram joined the Army Air Forces during the war,
quickly “rising to the rank of major” and earning the Legion of Merit
for his outstanding service in war.98 “At the close of hostilities,” Abram
moved to Germany and joined U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert
Jackson’s legal staff in Nuremburg at the International Military
Tribunal.99 When Abram returned home, he collaborated with lawyers
from the Anti-Defamation League to draft legislation aimed at
breaking the Klan’s stranglehold on the South.100
By the mid-1960s, Abram had developed a national reputation for
civil rights leadership.101 Perhaps most notably, Abram was an attorney
for the movement’s most recognizable figure, Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.102 Abram, like King, was then an Atlanta resident; served as a
trustee at King’s alma mater, Morehouse College; and had been
involved in civil rights activism with a wide range of movement
organizations, including the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”), the Southern Regional
Council, and the Congress of Racial Equality.103 Abram was also a
distinguished U.S. Supreme Court advocate. One of his touchstone
97. ABRAM, supra note 12, at 55–56, 58.
98. Id. at 66; Abram, Extended Biography, supra note 96.
99. Abram, Extended Biography, supra note 96, at 1, 4.
100. ABRAM, supra note 12, at 86–87. The statute, which criminalized public mask-wearing,
was enacted in five states and fifty-five Southern cities. Abram, Extended Biography, supra note
99, at 2–3.
101. See, e.g., Jewish Unit Picks National Leader: Morris Abram Is Chosen by Committee on
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1964, at 73 (referencing Abram’s national reputation as “as an
attorney in crucial cases dealing with major civil rights and civil liberties issues”).
102. Abram, Extended Biography, supra note 96, at 3; see also Real Drama Followed the
Kennedy Call in King Case, NORFOLK J. & GUIDE, Dec. 31, 1960, at 8 (explaining how Abram
became involved in the King case).
103. See, e.g., Biographical Sketch of Morris B. Abram (Jan. 1964) (on file with National
Archives, College Park, Md., Central Foreign Policy Files, Record Group 59, Box 3204, Folder
SOC 14 Human Rights, Race Relations); Attorney Morris Abram Slated To Address NAACP
‘Crusade’ Meet, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, Mar. 7, 1954, at 1 (discussing Abram’s delivery of a
keynote address at an NAACP program in anticipation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education); Dixie Leadership on Bias Assailed: Regional Council Asks South
To Repudiate ‘Fraudulent’ Voices on School Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1955, at 28 (noting that
Abram served on the SRC’s executive committee and was active in the fight against massive
resistance to Brown); Rights Suit Assails Americus Jailings, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 11, 1963, at
24 (serving as a lawyer for a Congress of Racial Equity member facing the death penalty for his
civil rights activism in Southwest Georgia); Major King Events Chronology: 1929-1968,
STANFORD: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. RSCH. & EDUC. INST., https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/
king-resources/major-king-events-chronology-1929-1968 [https://perma.cc/B9F4-7PRG].
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civil rights victories was the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision
recognizing the “one person, one vote” principle.104 And Abram’s
interests in extending equality were not cabined to the domestic realm;
he continued to engage with issues of equality internationally. Abram
served as the first general counsel to the Peace Corps and occupied the
liberal edge of the New Frontier as a key human rights voice in the
Kennedy White House.105
In 1963, as the global fight against discrimination escalated, State
Department officials were seeking new human rights staffers to ensure
that the U.S. delegation was “equipped to give leadership as well as
handle emergencies” at the United Nations.106 One person immediately
stood out in their personnel search. “As you know, our first choice,” a
State Department staffing memo disclosed, “is Morris Abram.”107 The
State Department memo described Abram as someone who could
serve as a “special-adviser-trouble shooter.”108 The State Department
also recognized that the upcoming U.N. session would be anything but
ordinary. They needed staffers who could help the United States
manage what one official called the “crisis character of human rights
issues” before the United Nations.109 Abram squarely fit the bill. In
Abram, the State Department had selected someone whose
background and experience made him very well equipped to speak
directly to two of the most pressing legal issues then on the United
Nation’s agenda: the creation of human rights instruments on race and
religion.

104. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 369, 381 (1963) (declaring that “[t]he conception of
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one
vote”).
105. Abram Back from U. S. Peace Corps in Tanganyika, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, Dec. 15,
1961, at 1; Biographical Sketch of Morris B. Abram, supra note 103. See generally Irving
Bernstein, PROMISES KEPT: JOHN F. KENNEDY’S NEW FRONTIER (1993) (describing how
President John F. Kennedy used the idea of a “New Frontier” to offer a bold vision for solving
national and international problems and how this political slogan transformed into a description
of Kennedy administration programs like the Peace Corps).
106. See, e.g., Memorandum from Nathaniel McKitterick, Dep’t of State Bureau of Internal
Org. Affs., to Mr. Cleveland, Dep’t of State Bureau of Oceans & Env’t & Sci. Affs. 1 (July 23,
1963) (on file with John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Box 114, Folder U.N.
Human Rights).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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State Department officials shortly thereafter named Clyde
Ferguson, a Black attorney considered “one of the best civil rights legal
brains in the country,” as Morris Abram’s alternate to the SubCommission.110 Ferguson was born in Wilmington, North Carolina, to
a prominent Methodist preacher, who took his family north as part of
the Great Migration.111 Ferguson excelled academically, graduating Phi
Beta Kappa from Ohio State University, but unlike Abram, Ferguson
declined a Rhodes nomination.112 In the 1940s, Ferguson joined the war
effort and shone in battle, winning a Bronze Star for his heroism “in
the European and . . . Southwest Pacific [t]heatres.”113 In the 1950s, the
Harvard Law School honors graduate gained a wealth of experience in
international human rights law and politics.114 He represented the
United States at the Western Hemisphere United Nations Economic,
Social, and Cultural Organization’s (“UNESCO”) conference.115 And
in the fall of 1963, Ferguson was named dean of the Howard University
School of Law—the civil rights citadel that had produced Thurgood
Marshall.116 In his capacity on the Sub-Commission, Ferguson would
negotiate with U.N. working parties, assist with drafting international
legislation, and surrogate as the U.S. member in Abram’s absence.117

110. Ferguson New Howard Law Dean, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Aug. 10, 1963, at 4; see
also Clarence Clyde Ferguson Jr. (1924-1983): Highlights of an Impressive Career, 1 BLACK
LETTER J. 17, 18 (1984) [hereinafter Highlights of an Impressive Career] (stating that Ferguson
“served as United States Alternate to the United States Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination”). Ferguson’s accolades also included serving as a teaching fellow-in-law at
Harvard Law School, a teaching assistant in the department of general education at Harvard
College, an assistant professor at Rutgers Law School, general counsel of the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights, and dean of the Howard University School of Law. Id. at 17–18.
111. B.M. Phillips, ‘I Had High Hopes’, BALT. AFRO-AM., Aug. 17, 1963, at 5.
112. Highlights of an Impressive Career, supra note 110, at 17; ABRAM, supra note 12, at 55–
56, 58.
113. Highlights of an Impressive Career, supra note 110, at 17; see also C. C. Ferguson Jr. on
Harvard Staff, BALT. AFRO-AM, May 19, 1951, at 7 (describing Ferguson as “[a] war veteran who
saw service in both Europe and the Philippines”).
114. See Highlights of an Impressive Career, supra note 110, at 17.
115. Id. at 18.
116. Clarence Ferguson Appointed Howard University Law Dean, BALT. AFRO-AM., Aug.
10, 1963, at 3; LDF Director-Counsels: Thurgood Marshall 1940-1961, LDF, https://
www.naacpldf.org/about-us/history/thurgood-marshall [https://perma.cc/UT5N-PUTG].
117. See Rupert G. John, U.N. Division of Human Rights to Morris B. Abram (Dec. 6, 1963)
(on file with MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination, Etc., 1964); see also Abram-Ferguson Letter, supra note 18 (discussing dates
when Abram would be absent from a Sub-Commission meeting and requesting feedback on draft
comments for that meeting).
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The State Department had selected one of Black America’s leading
representatives.118
State Department officials were also clear that, in naming
Ferguson to the post, they could demonstrate their commitment to
ending racial discrimination in the United States to the world.119 Only
weeks after Martin Luther King, Jr. penned his “Letter from
Birmingham Jail,”120 he published a hard-hitting editorial in which he
described Birmingham as “the last stop before Johannesburg, South
Africa.”121 The analogies between “petty apartheid” and “grand
apartheid” were gaining traction, Ambassador Stevenson’s staffers
stressed, so they sought additional special advisers to help keep
Stevenson informed of “race developments in the [United States] and
. . . apartheid in South Africa” during the General Assembly’s debates
of the Declaration.122 Ferguson’s experience with civil and human
rights law as well as his race proved to be significant in his appointment
as a special adviser to Stevenson during the Declaration debates;123
they were very likely significant when the State Department appointed
him to be Abram’s alternate during the Convention debates. “Our
preference is Clyde Ferguson,” a State Department memorandum
revealed in Ferguson’s selection as a special adviser.124 The
memorandum emphasized Ferguson’s experience as general counsel to
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, but the State Department also
turned to two other substantial considerations in Ferguson’s

118. See KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWYER 37 (2012) (describing the phenomenon of a race representative as a “black
person who crossed racial lines, and often shook up the expectations of a segregated society”).
Mack writes, “[t]o focus on ‘progress’ and ‘representative Negroes’ as a civil rights claim was to
make the mere existence of the black lawyer into a potent argument of equality.” Id. at 32.
119. See Memorandum from Mr. McKitterick, Dep’t of State Bureau of Internal Org. Affs.,
to Mr. Cleveland, Dep’t of State Bureau of Oceans & Env’t & Sci. Affs. 1 (July 16, 1963) (on file
with John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Box 114, Folder U.N. Human Rights)
[hereinafter Memorandum from Mr. McKitterick to Mr. Cleveland].
120. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 64,
64 (2000).
121. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Birmingham, U.S.A.: How It All Began, N.Y. AMSTERDAM
NEWS, June 8, 1963, at 10.
122. See WINSTON A. GRADY-WILLIS, CHALLENGING U.S. APARTHEID: ATLANTA AND
BLACK STRUGGLES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1960–1977, at xviii (2006) (offering a historical
comparison of the apartheid structures in the U.S. South and South Africa); Memorandum from
Mr. McKitterick to Mr. Cleveland, supra note 119.
123. See Memorandum from Mr. McKitterick to Mr. Cleveland, supra note 119.
124. Id.
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selection.125 “He is a Negro,” the memorandum underscored, and
“someone already familiar with the U.N.”126
The
State
Department’s
personnel
decisions
were
groundbreaking. Both Abram and Ferguson were immensely talented,
but they offered much more than their considerable intellectual
abilities to the U.S. delegation to the Sub-Commission. State
Department officials recognized that civil and human rights were not
simply moral issues; they were also foreign policy issues.127 The State
Department had tapped two high-profile civil rights lawyers to
champion U.S. constitutional values. Both men were natives of the
South, the region of the country so fiercely criticized at the United
Nations, and their personal and professional backgrounds lent
immediate credibility to the United States’ position.128 The U.S.
delegation embodied the nation’s commitment to racial progress.
Together, these men told a remarkable story of how the United States’
ongoing social transformation could serve as a model for the world.
The State Department’s selection was audacious.
The State Department had obvious foreign policy incentives to
send an interracial and interfaith delegation to the Sub-Commission
for the Convention debates, but these motivations were particularly
important given the Sub-Commission’s protocol. With Abram and
Ferguson as U.S. experts, the United States did not need to violate the
Sub-Commission’s rules by publicly discussing the nation’s
commitment to social progress.129 Abram and Ferguson provided the
Kennedy administration with two highly visible and tangible indicators
of that progress. The composition of the delegation would speak for
itself. The State Department had been known, in many circles, as an
“Old Boys’ Club” with a thin record of appointing minorities to key

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (“[T]he decision in Brown . . . cannot be understood
without some consideration of the decision’s value to . . . whites in policymaking positions able to
see the economic and political advances at home and abroad that would follow abandonment of
segregation.”); DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 6 (“[C]ivil rights reform
came to be seen as crucial to U.S. foreign relations.”).
128. See supra Part II.A and notes 95, 111.
129. See Eide, supra note 4, at 216–17 (noting that the Sub-Commission members were
prohibited from discussing country-specific developments).
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positions.130 The appointments of Abram and Ferguson caused no sea
change in U.S. race relations, yet the symbolism of their selections
mattered. The State Department appeared to be making a sincere and
conscious effort to live up to its calls for equality.
Substantively, the race leaders possessed cosmopolitan
worldviews, but they, particularly Abram, ultimately believed that the
U.S. federal government could and should be the world’s engine for
racial progress.131 Abram and Ferguson regularly demonstrated the
ability to close the gaps between the United States’ ideals and
practices, and they had built their reputations on excelling in these
crisis situations.132 The State Department widely distributed Abram
and Ferguson’s biographies to other delegations as part of U.N.
protocol, but their compelling personal narratives also offered the
United States a much greater public relations tool.133
Additionally, Abram and Ferguson were strong institutional fits
for the State Department’s plan because they personified the marriage

130. See MICHAEL L. KRENN, BLACK DIPLOMACY: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE STATE
DEPARTMENT, 1945-1969, at 9, 100, 131 (1999) (noting the growing demand for Black
representation in the State Department, and describing the appointment of two Black delegates).
131. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–51.
132. See supra notes 101–05, 110, infra note 135, and accompanying text.
133. Cf. Eide, supra note 4, at 252–54 (“The election has thus become a regular process of
nominations and competition among candidates. . . . [C]onsiderable lobbying has been
undertaken by some governments both for and against certain candidates . . . .”). National
governments nominated their citizens to the Sub-Commission, but the Sub-Commission had to
elect the nominee before they could become a Sub-Commission member. See id. at 253. As part
of the elections process, national governments widely distributed the biographies of their
nominees to the Sub-Commission to illustrate their nominee’s qualifications. See, e.g., Foreign
Service Dispatch from Zachary P. Geaneas, Chief Admin. Officer, USUN New York (on file with
author); see also Biography of Morris Berthold Abram (on file with MARBL, Abram Papers,
Box 94, Folder 8) (providing Abram’s biography); Biographical Summary of Clarence Clyde
Ferguson, Jr., General Counsel, Commission on Civil Rights, Professor of Law, Rutgers
University (on leave 1962–63) 1 (on file with MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 8)
(providing Ferguson’s biography). Abram, in particular, shared his personal experiences with the
Sub-Commission to attempt to shape the Sub-Commission’s debates. See, e.g., H. Timothy
Lovelace Jr., Making the World in Atlanta’s Image: The Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee, Morris Abram, and the Legislative History of the United Nations Race Convention, 32
LAW & HIST. REV. 385, 401 (2014) [hereinafter Lovelace, Making the World in Atlanta’s Image];
see also U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm’n on the Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities,
16th Sess., 420th mtg. at 4–5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.420 (Jan. 22, 1964) (leveraging his
experiences fighting the Ku Klux Klan to advance his position on how the Convention should
regulate hateful expressions).
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between the Cold War and the era’s “responsible” race leadership.134
The U.S. experts, like leading State Department officials, contended
that the United States could lead the world’s pursuit of freedom given
the trajectory of U.S. history and the moral superiority of U.S.
constitutional values.135 They believed that race relations were not
where they needed to be, but the men were quick to assert that the
nation was a far cry from the shadows of its gloomy past.136 The United
States’ racial tensions were simply growing pains in the evolution of
democratic governance. “We are in the midst of a revolution. I
sometimes call it the third American revolution,” Ferguson wrote,
echoing Adlai Stevenson.137 “In short, I think a revolution may be used
affirmatively. . . . [T]his revolution presents the grand opportunity to
seize the flux of change for the purpose of finally resolving our
problem.”138 Abram and Ferguson had devoted their adulthoods to
creating a world that embraced the very best U.S. ideals—or what they
perceived as such. Indeed, they had risked their lives for these ideals at
home and abroad.
Thus, Abram and Ferguson did not blush at the idea that
international human rights lawmaking, traditionally viewed as an
apolitical process, could be a powerful tool in fighting the Cold War.
Indeed, Abram reveled in it, believing that regardless of how lax the
United States was in enforcing human rights domestically, the nation
“[was] without fault compared to the rest of the world” and that other
countries should embrace U.S. values given the nation’s “moral

134. See Bell, supra note 127, at 524 (characterizing foreign relations and Cold War politics
as driving factors in the Brown v. Board of Education decision); Dudziak, Cold War Imperative,
supra note 77, at 63 (“[E]fforts to promote civil rights within the United States were consistent
with, and important to, the more central U.S. mission of fighting world communism.”).
135. See, e.g., Ferguson, Nature and Dimensions, supra note 23, at 462; ABRAM, supra note
12, at 150–51.
136. See Ferguson, Nature and Dimensions, supra note 23, at 452, 461–62; ABRAM, supra note
12, at 151. Ferguson asserted that the conception of human rights was the broadest it had been
“within any period within the last 100 years” in the United States and that the nation had
progressed rapidly during the last five years, but he also maintained that more work was still
needed to narrow the gap between its racial ideals and racial practices. Ferguson, Nature and
Dimensions, supra note 23, at 452, 461–62.
137. Ferguson, Nature and Dimensions, supra note 23, at 460; see Stevenson, supra note 61,
at 1 (“In my own country, we are even now living through our third revolution in the name of
freedom.”).
138. Ferguson, Nature and Dimensions, supra note 23, at 460.

LOVELACE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1874

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/16/2022 6:46 PM

[Vol. 71:1849

authority.”139 There were also real reputational costs for the United
States if the nation did not lead the Convention’s drafting and
eventually ratify the treaty. Americans’ distaste for U.N. affairs, which
exploded at midcentury,140 was now self-defeating and outmoded. The
rapid growth in the number of newly independent countries at the
United Nations had radically shifted the direction of U.N. affairs.
Nonwhite nations were now in the majority in the General Assembly,
and they brought colonialism and racial discrimination to the forefront
of discussions.141 For most of the world, the Convention was the era’s
most anticipated human rights instrument.142 Abram and Ferguson
knew that if the United States truly desired to limit the Soviet sphere
of influence at the United Nations, the U.S. delegation needed to take
aggressive stances on human rights issues.
State Department officials had a final reason to feel confident that
Abram and Ferguson posed no real risk to U.S. foreign policy interests:
they were political appointees.143 Abram, for example, had strong ties
to President John F. Kennedy from the earliest days of his presidential
run.144 During the 1960 race, the Democratic stalwart stumped for
Kennedy in Georgia and masterfully converted registered Black
Atlantans into Kennedy voters.145 The thoroughly vetted U.S. experts
cringed at the thought of embarrassing their president or their nation

139. Interview by Michael L. Gillette with Morris Abram, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (May 3, 1984),
in LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORIES, LYNDON B. JOHNSON PRESIDENTIAL
LIBRARY 8, https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/oh-abramm-19840503-2-94-6 [https://perma.cc/
9GXY-CJXQ].
140. See Carol Anderson, A “Hollow Mockery”: African Americans, White Supremacy, and
the Development of Human Rights in the United States, in 1 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A
HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 75, 90–93 (Cynthia Soohoo, Catherine
Albisa & Martha F. Davis eds., 2008) [hereinafter BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME].
141. Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., The United Nations Convention on Racial Discrimination:
Civil Rights by Treaty, 1 LAW TRANSITION Q. 61, 61 (1964) [hereinafter Ferguson, United
Nations].
142. See G.A. Res. 1906 (XVIII), at 38 (Nov. 20, 1963) (proclaiming that drafting the
Convention was the United Nations’ “absolute priority”).
143. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150 (stating that President Kennedy sent Abram as the
“representative to the Subcommission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of
Minorities and later as [the] representative to the Human Rights Commission”); see also Eide,
supra note 4, at 253 (“Candidates [to the Sub-Commission] must be nominated by their
governments.”); Humphrey, supra note 7, at 871 (explaining that the Sub-Commission consisted
of experts chosen with the “consent of the governments of which they were nationals”).
144. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 124–26.
145. See, e.g., id. at 132 (explaining how Abram was able to convince Martin Luther King,
Sr., to publicly announce that he was going to vote for Kennedy).
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while at the United Nations.146 They worked closely with the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations during the treaty negotiations and
embraced their status as de facto agents of the State Department.147
Although Abram and Ferguson were technically operating in their
“individual capacities” as Sub-Committee experts and could
theoretically go rogue, there were no questions about the experts’
fidelity to their country. They had the guidance papers and security
clearances to prove it.148
Abram and Ferguson themselves recognized a grand opportunity
to implement real change both globally and domestically, and this
incredible collaboration engendered trust. Indeed, Abram and
Ferguson’s brand of racial diplomacy was a sharp rebuke of their
predecessors’ approach to international human rights law. Black
Americans working outside the auspices of the State Department had
petitioned the Sub-Commission and the Commission on Human Rights
with human rights complaints since its inception.149 Their pleas,
however, were met with devastating results. Shortly after the creation

146. Abram literally wrote that he was a “representative” of the United States sent to the
Sub-Commission by President John F. Kennedy, although each Sub-Commission member was
supposed to be an independent expert, operating in his own personal capacity and not serving as
a state “representative.” Id. at 150–51; see also Ferguson, CERD, supra note 19, at 41–42
(“[T]here was very active participation on the expert level by two U.S. citizens in the
Subcommission on Discrimination.”). Similarly, although Ferguson and Abram were operating
on the Sub-Commission technically in their individual capacities, Ferguson characterized the
contributions he and Abram made during the drafting debates as the “full participation by the
U.S.”—not merely the efforts of two experts with no national backing. Id. Moreover, Ferguson
described the work that he and Abram did in geopolitical terms, arguing that he and Abram very
likely outperformed the formal U.S. representatives charged with negotiating the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights. Id. Ferguson said that he suspected “that in the convention we have an
instrument that, when compared to the covenants, is a better document in terms of U.S. interest,
the expression of U.S. values, and the expression of the U.S. view about what should be done to
eliminate racial discrimination.” Id. at 42. Both men viewed their service on the Sub-Commission
as extensions of U.S. foreign policy. See id.; ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150.
147. Abram and Ferguson soon occupied even greater roles in formulating the U.S. civil and
human rights policy. In 1965, for example, Johnson appointed Abram the U.S. delegate to the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights and Ferguson the full-time U.S. member of the SubCommission, and both men also played instrumental roles in planning and executing the 1966
White House Conference on Civil Rights. See Abram, Extended Biography, supra note 96, at 2–
3 (describing Abram’s role in the Commission on Human Rights and the White House
Conference on Civil Rights); Biographic Sketch of Clarence Clyde Ferguson (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library, Clarence Clyde Ferguson Papers, Box 12, Folder 9).
148. See, e.g., Guidance Paper, supra note 20, at 1.
149. See ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 109–11.
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of the United Nations, W.E.B. Du Bois, the towering intellectual,
NAACP founder, and Pan-Africanist, appealed to the United Nations,
charging the United States with violating Black Americans’ human
rights.150 But Eleanor Roosevelt, then Commission on Human Rights
Chair, U.S. delegate to the United Nations, and an NAACP board
member, fumed that Du Bois’s attempts to tarnish the nation’s image
had given credence to the communists’ claims about the inadequacies
of U.S. democracy.151 Roosevelt worked with U.S. officials to bury Du
Bois’s petition, and the civil rights group demoted and then removed
Du Bois from his leadership position in the NAACP—the very
organization he helped found four decades earlier—for his willingness
to shame the United States at the United Nations.152 Similarly, William
Patterson, attorney and national secretary of the Civil Rights Congress,
charged the United States with genocide in a 1951 U.N. petition.153 He
was soon stripped of his passport and publicly scorned for allegedly
aiding the Soviet cause.154 When Paul Robeson became a prominent
critic of U.S. racism on the international stage, he too found himself on
the political margins. The civil rights leader, award-winning
entertainer, and darling of Black America was blacklisted, stripped of
his passport, and blasted by the press and the liberal establishment for
his reported communist ties.155
Abram and Ferguson took a different tack, instead opting to
leverage their relationship with the State Department. Shaming the
United States at the United Nations or looking to “foreign” legal
standards to improve the lived experiences of Black Americans could

150. MANNING MARABLE, W.E.B. DU BOIS: BLACK RADICAL DEMOCRAT 169 (Routledge
2016) (1986); W.E.B. Du Bois, NAACP, https://naacp.org/find-resources/history-explained/civilrights-leaders/web-du-bois [https://perma.cc/9BJJ-NEWA].
151. See MARABLE, supra note 150; see also DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS: A
BIOGRAPHY 676 (2009) (illustrating that Mrs. Roosevelt believed that “no good could come
from” putting the petition on the agenda); BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, supra note 140, at
90 (identifying Mrs. Roosevelt as Commission on Human Rights Chair).
152. LEWIS, supra note 151, at 676–77.
153. See GERALD HORNE, BLACK REVOLUTIONARY: WILLIAM PATTERSON AND THE
GLOBALIZATION OF THE AFRICAN AMERICAN FREEDOM STRUGGLE 1–2 (2013). See generally
CIVIL RIGHTS CONGRESS, WE CHARGE GENOCIDE: THE HISTORIC PETITION TO THE UNITED
NATIONS FOR RELIEF FROM A CRIME OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE
NEGRO PEOPLE (William L. Patterson ed., 1951) (displaying Patterson’s charge).
154. See Mary L. Dudziak, Josephine Baker, Racial Protest, and the Cold War, 81 J. AM. HIST.
543, 566 (1994).
155. Id. at 546, 554, 565–66.
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easily cause racial backlash, Ferguson explained.156 Ferguson
recognized how an older generation of civil rights lawyers and activists
had sparked a firestorm when they used international human rights law
to illustrate the shortcomings of U.S. constitutionalism.157 Their human
rights strategies suggested that subversive forces controlled the civil
rights movement. As one example, fear that presidents might agree to
human rights treaties that could impose limitations on federal and state
law (including limits on segregation statutes) led xenophobic Ohio
Senator John W. Bricker to propose a constitutional amendment to
limit the president’s ability to agree to treaties.158 Though it narrowly
lost in the Senate, the so-called “Bricker episode” showed the
perceived dangers of using international human rights to promote
domestic civil rights goals.159 These confrontational tactics also
threatened to alienate would-be allies in the State Department—the
same constituency that proved essential to the victory in Brown v.
Board of Education160 and that was proving valuable in the push toward
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.161 Collaborating with the State
Department had the potential to advance the domestic civil rights
movement without causing the racial backlash prior efforts had
produced. In fact, this strategy would give the movement new
legitimacy. After all, what Black Americans really wanted was in the
nation’s best interests, Abram and Ferguson maintained. They were
simply asking for the blessings of democracy, the same rights and
privileges bestowed to other citizens.
Fostering a greater appreciation of global politics to aid the
movement in the United States was especially important for Ferguson.
156. Ferguson, CERD, supra note 19, at 45 (explaining how a more radical internationalist
approach to domestic racial reform spurred the Bricker amendment).
157. Id.
158. See BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, supra note 140, at 90–91.
159. See id. at 90–93 (arguing that Brickerism contributed to silencing progressive civil rights
voices, narrowing acceptable civil rights discourse, and limiting the United States’ involvement
and embrace of international human rights law).
160. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
161. See BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 93, at 11–12 (“And in the brief submitted . . .
‘It is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom and tyranny that the problem
of racial discrimination must be viewed . . . [for] discrimination against minority groups in the
United States has an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries.’” (alteration in
original) (footnote omitted)). The Justice Department worked with the State Department to help
produce the government’s brief in Brown. The brief quoted a letter from the Secretary of State
to the Attorney General dated December 2, 1952. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae
at 6–8, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (Nos. 8, 101, 191, 413, 448).
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He hypothesized that racial progress would not occur in the United
States without judges and policymakers recognizing the impact of
domestic race relations on U.S. foreign policy.162 When these key
stakeholders acknowledged Jim Crow’s reputational costs, they would
be more likely to support domestic civil rights reforms. Scholars of U.S.
constitutional law and many everyday citizens in the 1950s often used
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown to explain how the Cold War
could benefit the U.S. civil rights movement.163 Ferguson’s first book,
Desegregation and the Law, affirmed this perspective, postulating that
Cold War tensions likely informed the Justices’ decision in Brown.164
Ferguson found that foreign policy was integral to the parties’ briefs in
the case, as was evident in both the NAACP’s and the Justice
Department’s court papers.165 The Justice Department in particular
emphasized that racial discrimination and segregation in the United
States could become fodder for communist propaganda mills and could
make countries doubt the United States’ commitment to freedom,
justice, and democracy.166
162. See BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 93, at 11 (explaining that the NAACP
recognized how racial segregation shaped the United States’ perception internationally).
Interestingly, in 1980, Professor Derrick Bell made essentially the same argument that Ferguson
made some twenty years earlier in a foundational critical race theory text, Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma. Bell, supra note 127, at 524. Bell and Ferguson
were colleagues at Harvard at that time. Id.
163. See, e.g., BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 93, at 11–13.
164. Id. at 12 (“It is inconceivable that the international discord between East and West had
no effect upon the nine men who were to determine a national discord between North and
South.”).
165. Id. at 11 (“The lawyers for the NAACP wrote: ‘Survival of our country in the present
international situation is inevitably tied to resolution of this domestic issue.’” (footnote omitted));
id. at 12 (noting that the Justice Department stated that the “context of the present world struggle
between freedom and tyranny . . . [for] discrimination against minority groups in the United
States has an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries” (alteration in original)
(footnote omitted)).
166. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae, supra note 161. Many people in the
United States also appreciated the global significance of the Court’s decision. In Desegregation
and the Law, Blaustein and Ferguson sampled from the era’s popular periodicals for evidence:
Time, in typical Time style, observed: “The international effect may be scarcely less
important. In many countries, where U.S. prestige and leadership have been damaged
by the fact of U.S. segregation, it will come as a timely reassertion of the basic
American principle that ‘all men are created equal.’” Time’s companion publication,
Life, supported this position with the assertion that the Supreme Court “at one stroke
immeasurably raised the respect of other nations for the U.S.” . . . More dramatic was
the summary in the tenth anniversary issue of the Negro magazine, Ebony: “Negro
America fashioned a chain of political, social[,] and economic victories that were
discussed in Europe, applauded in Asia[,] and imitated in Africa . . . the [legal]
advances of the last decade strengthened the cause of freedom everywhere.”

LOVELACE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

CIVIL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS

4/16/2022 6:46 PM

1879

But the U.S. experts were not only focused on domestic progress.
The U.S. strategy might also allow the civil rights lawyers a way to plant
their law and policy ideas into constitutions abroad.167 Countries
experiencing social upheavals, wrestling with constitutional chaos, or
emerging as newly independent frequently borrowed from
international instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to establish domestic rule of law.168 Abram and Ferguson
recognized that if the United States did not adequately participate in
the Convention debates, when these politically fragile societies
domesticated the treaty, as many countries would later do, their laws
might resemble the Soviet Constitution.169 The United States would be
rendered an outlier in global race relations, U.S. law and democracy
would be on the outskirts, and other “engine[s] of repression” would
take hold.170
Instead, the pair believed that the newly independent countries at
the United Nations could find a clear path to modernity by adopting
the constitutional values in the United States’ draft of the Convention.
The U.S. Constitution, they argued, provided the human rights
protections necessary to ensure an inclusive multiracial and
multiethnic democracy.171 Ensuring equality before law for diverse
populations was indeed challenging, but the U.S. experts preached

BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 93, at 12–13 (footnotes omitted).
167. For example, Ferguson himself explained that it was “likely that [the United Nations
Convention against Racial Discrimination] . . . [would] demonstrate more so than ever, the truism
that foreign policy is simply the logical extension of domestic policy.” Clarence Clyde Ferguson,
Jr., The United Nations Human Rights Covenants: Problems of Ratification and Implementation,
62 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 83, 90 (1968) [hereinafter Problems of Ratification and
Implementation].
168. See, e.g., id. at 89 (providing several examples of countries adopting principles or
language from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
169. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–51 (describing how he used his time on the SubCommission to counter the Soviet Union’s ideas).
170. See Lovelace, Making the World in Atlanta’s Image, supra note 133, at 400 (“I was keenly
aware that I [Abram] was representing the only great power that stands for human rights . . . .”
(quoting ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–51)).
171. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–51. The experts’ entire project revolved around the
idea that U.S. democracy was morally superior to other forms of government and that this treaty
designed to serve the world should mirror U.S. civil rights law and policy. E.g., Lovelace, Making
the World in Atlanta’s Image, supra note 133, at 403–04 (“State Department officials instructed
Abram to emphasize that the American constitutional protections were consistent with human
rights norms and that Article 9 of the Declaration and the provision that would become Article 4
of the Convention were deviations from longstanding human rights traditions.” (footnote
omitted)).
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democracy’s unqualified application to all people.172 As evidence of
this fact, the U.S. delegation pointed to “former totalitarian states such
as Germany, Italy, and Japan bec[oming] functioning democracies”
after U.S. occupation and “Soviet occupation never birth[ing] a
democratic regime.”173
Equally important, Abram and Ferguson were themselves
engaging in the kind of desegregationist project at the United Nations
that they had engaged in domestically. They lived their politics on U.S.
soil and aspired to be at the forefront of an international movement to
safeguard minority rights. Abram’s advocacy on behalf of Soviet Jews
exemplified how the U.S. experts’ service on the Sub-Commission
transformed into an opportunity to promulgate their own ideas for
global equality.174 Although the Russian member of the SubCommission praised the Soviet Union’s civil rights protections, the
Soviets still engaged in anti-Semitic programs on a vast scale.175 In this
light, Abram could decry the Soviet Constitution for being a sham and
use his new platform to develop international instruments targeting
religious and racial persecution.176 Partnering with the State
Department afforded the U.S. experts the ability to harness the power
of the state in ways that gave the U.S. lawyers and their causes greater
global prominence.
This experiment in diplomacy was rooted in an abiding faith in the
United States’ future. The State Department and the U.S. experts
possessed a gritty determination to make democracy work. Such a
model for global race reform fostered great cooperation where there
had been deep suspicion and reflected serious study of social
172. See, e.g., ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–51 (describing the United States as “the only
great power that [stood] for human rights”). Abram was so convinced that his vision of democratic
governance could produce racial progress across the world that he flew the Sub-Commission to
Atlanta in 1964 to study race relations in the city. Lovelace, Making the World in Atlanta’s Image,
supra note 133, at 385–86, 401. Abram hoped that Sub-Commission’s visit to the Southern capital
would educate foreigners on the United States and its model city of Atlanta, and thus would limit
Soviet influence during the Convention’s debates. Id. at 400–01, 401 n.52.
173. ABRAM, supra note 12, at 151.
174. See id. at 152 (“As I got to know my Russian colleagues, I began to confront them not
only with their anti-Semitism but with the wide-scale violation of human rights in the Gulag
Archipelago and throughout their vast dominions.”).
175. Id. at 151–52. See generally Moshe Decter, The Status of the Jews in the Soviet
Union, 41 FOREIGN AFFS. 420 (1963) (discussing how anti-Semitic policies in the Soviet Union
violated principles of self-determination and cultural freedom).
176. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 151–52, 154 (explaining how Abram was gaining political
traction to eliminate racial discrimination and promote religious freedom).
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movement lawyering. The partnership was, for some, a testament of
hope.

III. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS A PUBLIC PROBLEM
The United States’ members produced the Sub-Commission’s first
draft of the Convention.177 Thereafter, however, the Soviet-Polish
Eastern bloc quickly circulated a competing draft.178 Although several
similarities existed between the U.S. and Eastern bloc drafts—such as
a mandate to end state-sponsored discrimination179 and protection of
affirmative action programs180—the Eastern bloc’s draft provided far
more expansive protections against racial discrimination.181 The
competing drafts reignited familiar debates about the U.S.
government’s ability and willingness to redress racism. Abram and
Ferguson, seeking to produce a Convention that accorded with the U.S.
Constitution, pushed the Sub-Commission to adopt a draft Convention
177. See generally Suggested Draft for U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Jan. 7, 1964) (on file with MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 3)
[hereinafter Suggested Draft for CERD].
178. See Ivanov and Ketrzynski, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.314 (Jan. 15, 1964).
179. Compare id. at 2 (prohibiting contracting parties from “acts or manifestations of racial
discrimination” in “political, economic, social, cultural, or any other field or public life”), with
Suggested Draft for CERD, supra note 177, at 2 (“No State Party shall make any discrimination
whatsoever against persons, groups of persons or institutions on the grounds of race, color, or
ethnic origin, or where applicable, on the basis of ‘nationality’ or national origin.”).
180. Compare Ivanov and Ketrzynski, supra note 178, at 3 (requiring that state parties to the
Convention “provide the training of skilled manpower and expert personnel [to] groups . . .
formerly deprived of the right to education” due to racial discrimination), with Suggested Draft
for CERD, supra note 177, at 2–3 (“A State Party may take special concrete measures in
appropriate circumstances in order to secure adequate development or protection of individuals
belonging to certain racial groups with the object of ensuring the full enjoyment of such
individuals of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”). For more on Soviet visions of
affirmative action, see generally TERRY MARTIN, THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EMPIRE: NATIONS
AND NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1923–1939 (2001) (describing the Soviet Union’s
longstanding system of managing a multiethnic population through ethnic conscious policies as
“affirmative action”); Constantin Katsakioris, The Soviet-South Encounter: Tensions in the
Friendship with Afro-Asian Partners, 1945–1965, in COLD WAR CROSSINGS: INTERNATIONAL
TRAVEL AND EXCHANGE ACROSS THE SOVIET BLOC, 1940s–1960s, at 134, 145 (Patrick
Babiracki & Kenyon Zimmer eds., 2014) (describing how, in 1960, Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev established a university in Moscow for training “Asian, African, and Latin
American” students).
181. See Ivanov and Ketrzynski, supra note 178, at 2–3 (requiring state parties to the
Convention “to prohibit and disband racist [and] fascist . . . organizations,” end racial
discrimination in economic rights, and abolish housing discrimination including “reservations
perpetuating and aggravating racial discrimination”).
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that permitted state enforcement only against public actors.182
Ultimately, after debate with other countries’ experts and through
compromises with the U.K. expert, the U.S. experts succeeded in
creating an interpretation of the Convention to counter the Eastern
bloc’s draft.183
A. The Americans’ Draft of ICERD
Abram and Ferguson collaborated with officials from the State
Department, the Justice Department, and the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights to compose language for the U.S. draft of the
Convention.184 The interagency group’s main function was to help the
secretary of state develop the United States’ position on all human
rights issues facing international bodies.185 At times, Abram and
Ferguson faced considerable opposition in the State Department and
Justice Department over the “issue of a UN Convention dealing with
race,” but the Interdepartmental Committee was able to help develop
eight substantive articles in time for the Sub-Commission’s January
1964 session.186 Abram and Ferguson recognized that the General
182. Suggested Draft for CERD, supra note 177, at 2 (“No State Party shall make any
discrimination whatsoever against persons, groups of persons[,] or institutions on the grounds of
race, color, or ethnic origin, or where applicable, on the basis of ‘nationality’ or national origin.”);
see Guidance Paper, supra note 20, at 4 (“On the development of text . . . the approach should be
along lines of the ‘equal protection’ concept in our 14th Amendment.”).
183. See Comments by Dean Clyde Ferguson, Jr. (Morris Abram concurring) on SubCommission Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Preamble and Substantive Articles 2–3 (Jan. 30, 1964) (on file with MARBL, Abram Papers,
Folder 94, Box 1) (showing the U.S. experts’ endorsement of the reading of the controversial
Convention provision); see also Personal Report by Peter Calvocoressi (Feb. 4, 1964) (on file with
National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom, Population and Discrimination: Sub-Commission on
Discrimination, FO 371/178331) [hereinafter Calvocoressi Report] (showing the U.K. expert’s
endorsement of the reading of the controversial Convention provision).
184. See International Protection of Human Rights: The Work of International Organizations
and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs. and Movements
of the Comm. on Foreign Affs., 93d Cong. 321 (1973) (statement of Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh,
President, University of Notre Dame, Former Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights)
(explaining that he was part of this committee, “which was responsible for developing the United
States’ position on all human rights subjects coming before international bodies”).
185. Id.
186. C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., 70 AM. J. INT’L L. 610, 610 (1976) (reviewing NATHANIEL L.
NATHANSON & EGON SCHWELB, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS TREATY ON
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A REPORT FOR THE PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION (1975)); see also Abram-Ferguson Letter, supra note 18
(requesting Ferguson’s comments on his drafts); 1964 Nason-Abram Letter, supra note 18
(providing Abram with notes on the substantive changes made to the draft). Abram and Ferguson
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Assembly expected the United States to use the Declaration as the
basis for the Convention. So, the U.S. experts, in consultation with the
Interdepartmental Committee, adapted the Declaration’s language to
accord with “the ‘equal protection’ concept in [the] 14th
Amendment.”187
Article I of the U.S. draft Convention defined racial
discrimination. It read, “For the purpose of this convention, the term
racial discrimination includes any distinction, exclusion or preference
made on the basis of race, color, or ethnic origin[, or] . . . national
origin.”188 The remainder of the U.S. draft outlined the specific racial
obligations, pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, that each state
would undertake as a party to the Convention.189 These provisions were
fresh and progressive, reflecting the emerging constitutional values
shaping the contours of U.S. civil rights law and policy in the mid1960s.190
Article II of the U.S. draft reiterated Article I’s prohibition against
racial preferences but made one notable exception: affirmative
action.191 Ferguson, in particular, had been an early proponent of
affirmative action. In 1957, Ferguson delivered an address during a
National Bar Association conference urging the federal government to
expand the constitutional concept of nondiscrimination by providing
Black Americans with racial preferences in hiring.192 In the early 1960s,
as general counsel of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Ferguson
and Commission members supported Executive Orders 10925 and
11114, Kennedy administration initiatives aimed at diversifying federal

later added a ninth article addressing hate speech and hate organizations. U.N. ESCOR, SubComm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, Mr. Abram: Suggested Draft
for United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.308/Add.l (Jan. 13, 1964) [hereinafter Mr. Abram: Suggested Draft].
187. Compare Guidance Paper, supra note 20, at 4 (“On the development of text, coverage
should be limited to basic rights and the approach should be along lines of the ‘equal protection’
concept in our 14th Amendment.”), with G.A. Res. 1906 (XVIII), at 37 (Nov. 20, 1963) (noting
the importance of “adoption of an international convention on the elimination of all forms of
racial discrimination”).
188. Suggested Draft for CERD, supra note 177, at 2.
189. Id. at 2–5; see infra notes 191–204 and accompanying text (explaining the remainder of
the U.S. draft).
190. Suggested Draft for CERD, supra note 177, at 2–5; see also infra Part IV (discussing the
sit-in cases and the expanding constitutional notion of “state action”).
191. Suggested Draft for CERD, supra note 177, at 2–3.
192. Ferguson, Nature and Dimensions, supra note 23, at 459.
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employment and contracting.193 And as dean of Howard Law School,
Ferguson penned several articles praising the shifting emphasis in civil
rights from simple nondiscrimination mandates to more positive and
robust efforts like affirmative action.194 To this end, Article II also
authorized states to take steps to assure adequate protection and
development of positive measures for racial groups that had endured
past discrimination.195
Article III of the draft was similarly bold, mandating that states
“end without delay . . . governmental and other public policies of racial
segregation and especially policies of apartheid.”196 U.N. delegations,
regardless of political alliances, often held apartheid out as the world’s
monument to racial inequality, and Abram and Ferguson’s article
reflected the human rights consensus around South African race
relations.197
Article IV emanated directly from the U.S. sit-in movement and
the spirited congressional debates that eventually led to the enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.198 The provision required states to “take

193. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS ‘63: 1963 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS 89, 256 (1963); see also Memorandum from Mr. McKitterick to Mr. Cleveland,
supra note 119 (noting Ferguson’s work as general counsel to the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights).
194. Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Civil Rights Legislation 1964: A Study of Constitutional
Resources, 24 FED. BAR J. 102, 102, 104–05 (1964) [hereinafter Ferguson, Jr., Civil Rights
Legislation 1964]; see also Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., The Federal Interest in Employment
Discrimination: Herein the Constitutional Scope of Executive Power To Withhold Appropriated
Funds, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1964) (using two case studies to argue that affirmative action was
not “discrimination in reverse” and arguing that the federal government had the authority to
withhold federal funds from those that used those funds to discriminate).
195. Suggested Draft for CERD, supra note 177, at 2–3.
196. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
197. Shortly after its founding, the United Nations began passing a wide array of resolutions
regarding racism in South Africa. For resolutions on the “race conflict in South Africa resulting
from . . . apartheid,” see generally G.A. Res. 616 (VII) (Dec. 5, 1952) (emphasis omitted); G.A.
Res. 1016 (XI) (Jan. 30, 1957); G.A. Res. 1248 (XIII) (Oct. 30, 1958); G.A. Res. 1375 (XIV) (Nov.
17, 1959); G.A. Res. 1598 (XV) (Apr. 13, 1961); G.A. Res. 1663 (XVI) (Nov. 28, 1961); G.A. Res.
1761 (XVII) (Nov. 6, 1962). For resolutions also condemning the mistreatment of peoples of
Indian and Indo-Pakistan origin in South Africa, see generally G.A. Res. 44 (I) (Dec. 8, 1946);
G.A. Res. 395 (V) (Dec. 2, 1950); G.A. Res. 615 (VII) (Dec. 5, 1952); G.A. Res. 1179 (XII) (Nov.
26, 1957); G.A. Res. 1302 (XIII) (Dec. 10, 1958); G.A. Res. 1460 (XIV) (Dec. 10, 1959); G.A. Res.
1597 (XV) (Apr. 13, 1961); G.A. Res. 1662 (XVI) (Nov. 28, 1961).
198. Ferguson, CERD, supra note 19, at 42–43; see also TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE
TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 133, 135
(2011) (describing how the sit-ins played a critical role in the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act).
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effective measures, including the adoption of such legislation . . . to
assure equal access to any place or facility intended for use by the
general public.”199
Article V reiterated that states must prevent discrimination “in the
enjoyment of political and citizenship rights.”200
Articles VI and VII ensured equality in the administration of
justice. Article VI guaranteed all persons “equal justice under the law”
and the security of the person from bodily harm.201 Article VII ordered
states to provide “effective remed[ies] against . . . racial discrimination”
and “competent” tribunals to recognize those rights.202
Article VIII required states to “take immediate steps through
educational and other means . . . to promote understanding, tolerance,
and friendship among all nations and all peoples.”203 This article
reflected the longstanding position at the United Nations and in the
United States that education was essential to healing the world’s racial
divisions.204
The U.S. draft won international acclaim. The Atlanta Daily
World, the largest Black daily newspaper in the South, called the U.S.
proposal a “sweeping eight-point international treaty,” highlighted
Abram’s hometown roots, and congratulated the “distinguished
attorney” for spearheading the United Nations’ push to end racial
discrimination.205 The New York Times characterized the U.S. draft as
an innovative effort “to test sentiment at home and abroad on a treaty
attempting to ban racial bias,” and emphasized its wide-ranging ideas
on mechanisms to bar discrimination.206 In cities like Lagos, Nigeria;
Santiago, Chile; and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as well as in Sub-Saharan
Africa more generally, global media outlets covered the leading role
199. Suggested Draft for CERD, supra note 177, at 3.
200. Id. at 4.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 4–5.
204. See id. For a detailed treatment of how the United States and the United Nations
conceptualized the role of education in advancing antiracist, human rights norms, see generally
ANTHONY Q. HAZARD JR., POSTWAR ANTI-RACISM: THE UNITED STATES, UNESCO, AND
“RACE,” 1945-1968 (2012).
205. United Nations Rights Panel To Visit Atlanta, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, Jan. 19, 1964,
at 1; see ANDREW WIESE, PLACES OF THEIR OWN: AFRICAN AMERICAN SUBURBANIZATION IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 174 (2009).
206. Kathleen Teltsch, Pact To Ban Bias Proposed in U.N.: Draft Offered by American—
National Policies Asked, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1964, at 7.
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that the Sub-Commission’s U.S. members played in the Convention
debates207—all to the delight of State Department officials. Shortly
after Mohammed Mudawi, the Sub-Commission’s expert from Sudan,
learned that the U.S. draft would serve as the primary text for the
Convention debates, he declared that Convention should mandate that
state parties to the treaty adopt a constitutional amendment
prohibiting racial discrimination.208 “If a general provision akin to . . .
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution were
included in the [c]onstitution of a country,” Mudawi explained, “it
would be difficult to amend or delete it.” 209 One of Mr. Mudawi’s
colleagues soon reminded the group of the organ’s protocol restraining
references to state parties.210
The U.S. drafters wanted to be on the right side of human rights
history. Morris Abram characterized the Sub-Commission’s work as
one of the most important agenda items the secretary-general had ever
tasked it with and deemed the treaty drafting as “literally epochal.”211
He was right. The Sub-Commission had never been charged with such
an awesome responsibility. For some in the international community,
the Sub-Commission merely studied global race relations, did little to
protect minorities, and was more of a geopolitical battleground than a
true human rights body.212 The Sub-Commission’s sixteenth session,
however, promised to produce an altogether different result. Drafting
the Convention was the United Nation’s “absolute priority” for the

207. For a sample of this international coverage, see, for example, Discrimination, W. AFR.
PILOT (Nigeria), Jan. 15, 1964, at 1; Comisión de la NU Observa Situación Racial en EE. UU., EL
MERCURIO (Chile), Jan. 27, 1964, at 33; UN Members Visit Atlanta, Georgia, ETHIOPIAN
HERALD, Jan. 24, 1964, at 4.
208. U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm’n on the Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of
Minorities, 16th Sess., 407th mtg. at 2, 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.407 (Jan. 14, 1964).
209. Id. at 11.
210. See Sub-Comm’n 408 mtg., supra note 56, at 5 (emphasizing that the Sub-Commission
members were “essentially experts and not diplomats” and should develop a universalist
approach to drafting).
211. Morris B. Abram, Statement at Sixteenth Session of U.N. Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Jan. 1964) (on file with MARBL,
Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 9) [hereinafter Abram Statement at U.N.] (providing the full text
of Abram’s statement); see also U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm’n on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Prot. of Minorities, 16th Sess., 405th mtg. at 3–4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.405 (Jan. 13,
1964) (providing the date and minutes from Abram’s full statement).
212. See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 5, at 872 (arguing that the United Nations had no
“serious intention of doing anything about minorities”).
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entire year,213 and Georgia’s native son was at the helm of this
unprecedented effort. The U.S. lawyer brimmed with expectation,
pledging to produce a document “not only for the people of the United
States” but for the “monumental benefit to every man, woman and
child on this planet.”214 The Southern statesman was convinced that he
would forever change the world.215
Clyde Ferguson, too, was caught up in the racial zeitgeist of the
1960s. He recognized that the drive to end colonialism and racial
discrimination was sweeping the globe.216 As such, he was part of a
Black internationalist tradition that placed Black American activism in
global terms.217 Ferguson realized that the struggle in the United States
was related to freedom movements in Africa and Asia. The
international forces opposing white colonialism had converged to
create the Convention.218
B. The Soviet’s Counter
Abram and Ferguson’s push to make the Convention in the
likeness of U.S. civil rights law and policy faced real obstacles from
other competing state interests at the Convention debates. Although
the U.S. experts had produced the Sub-Commission’s first Convention
draft, the Eastern bloc quickly countered. Perhaps more significantly,
the Eastern bloc’s draft seemed to overshadow the American proposal
through powerful mandates to end racial discrimination in broad,
substantive areas.219 At stake was the very conception of human rights.
For more than fifteen years, the Eastern and Western blocs had fought

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See G.A. Res. 1906 (XVIII), at 38 (Nov. 20, 1963).
Abram Statement at U.N., supra note 211, at 4.
Id.
Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 61.
For more on this internationalist tradition, see generally, for example, HENRY J.
RICHARDSON III, THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2008); KEVIN K. GAINES, AMERICAN AFRICANS IN GHANA: BLACK EXPATRIATES AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2006); Hope Lewis, Reflections on “Blackcrit Theory”: Human Rights, 45
VILL. L. REV. 1075 (2000); Gay J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International Regime: The
Domestic Relevance of International Efforts To Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40
HOW. L.J. 571 (1997); Henry J. Richardson III, African Americans and International Law: For
Professor Goler Teal Butcher, with Appreciation, 37 HOW. L.J. 217 (1994).
218. Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 61.
219. See Ivanov & Ketrzynski, supra note 178, at 1–3 (defining racial discrimination and
obliging states to adopt measures prohibiting racial discrimination in various areas).
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bitter drafting wars at the United Nations over this issue.220 The
wrangling was predictable, falling into a familiar split of positive versus
negative rights. The United States and many of its Western allies
argued that civil and political rights were the only justiciable human
rights.221 The Western bloc feared that placing economic, social, and
cultural rights on the same plane as civil and political rights might
undermine individual freedoms.222 The Soviet Union’s totalitarian state
was sufficient evidence. Moreover, many in the West argued that most
states were actually unable to deliver “economic, social, and cultural
rights.”223 These rights were nonjusticiable and difficult to measure and
implement, sowing the constitutional seeds for a sprawling welfare
state.224
Conversely, the Soviet Union and its closely aligned countries
decried the Western bloc for what they viewed as a laissez-faire
approach to social justice. They maintained that economic, social, and
cultural rights were at least as important as civil and political rights and
that civil and political rights were illusory when citizens did not have
economic, social, and cultural protections.225 What made this moment
in the Convention debates so fascinating was that the SubCommission’s Eastern bloc was arguing for the indivisibility of human
rights in the race context. Nondiscrimination in civil rights was not
enough, and neither was nondiscrimination in economic, social, and
cultural rights. The U.N. General Assembly had tasked the SubCommission with drafting a treaty that eliminated all forms of racial

220. See Stephen P. Marks, The Past and Future of the Separation of Human Rights into
Categories, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 209, 212–13 (2009); ROGER NORMAND & SARAH ZAIDI, HUMAN
RIGHTS AT THE U.N.: THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL JUSTICE 198–200 (2008).
221. See Marks, supra note 220, at 213, 215, 218, 240 (“Eleanor Roosevelt maintained that
economic, social, and cultural rights could not be regarded as justiciable in the same way as civil
and political rights . . . .”); NORMAND & ZAIDI, supra note 220, at 200–01.
222. See Marks, supra note 220, at 240–42.
223. See id. at 234–35.
224. See id. at 228–29, 237; see also Problems of Ratification and Implementation, supra note
167, at 90 (discussing the “dichotomy” of government obligations versus “limitations imposed
upon government”).
225. See Philip Alston, Economic and Social Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR
THE NEXT CENTURY 137, 147–51 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994); KITTY
ARAMBULO, STRENGTHENING THE SUPERVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS: THEORETICAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 17
(1999).

LOVELACE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

CIVIL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS

4/16/2022 6:46 PM

1889

discrimination.226 This was an uncompromising fight; there could be no
equivocation or division of rights.
The Sub-Commission’s Soviet and Polish experts, Boris Ivanov
and Wojciech Ketrzynski, circulated their version of the Convention to
the body’s other experts.227 The jointly authored text lacked the
craftsmanship of the U.S. draft and deviated structurally from the
Declaration, but the rich ideas in the text were not only morally
defensible but also politically viable. Article I of the Soviet-Polish draft
defined racial discrimination as “any differentiation, ban on access,
exclusion, preference[,] or limitation,” on minorities’ abilities to enjoy
“freedoms in political, economic, social, cultural, or any other field or
public life.”228 This provision reproduced the constellation of rights
recognized in the 1936 U.S.S.R. Constitution and its offspring, the 1952
Constitution of Poland.229 Pursuant to Article 123 of the Stalin
Constitution and Article 69 of the Polish Constitution, citizens had the
right to “enjoy equal rights in all spheres of public, political, economic,
social[,] and cultural life.”230 Ketrzynski, who doubled as an official in
the Polish Foreign Service, submitted the text on behalf of the SubCommission’s Eastern bloc.231
Article II of the Soviet-Polish draft enumerated the obligations of
each state party to the Convention.232 The proposed treaty’s list of
substantive rights was extensive. The Soviet-Polish draft, like its U.S.
226. See G.A. Res. 1906 (XVIII), at 38 (Nov. 20, 1963).
227. See generally Ivanov and Ketrzynski, supra note 178 (providing their version’s text as
circulated).
228. Id. at 2.
229. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1936) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 123;
KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] 1952, art. 69 (Pol.).
230. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] 1952, art. 69 (Pol.); cf.
KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1936) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 123 (mandating
nondiscrimination “in all spheres of economic, [public], cultural, social[,] and political life”); see
also Rep. of the Sixteenth Session of the Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot.
of Minorities to the Comm’n on Hum. Rts., at 21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/24l (Feb. 11, 1964)
[hereinafter Rep. of Sixteenth Session] (discussing the definition of “racial discrimination” as
proposed by Ivanov and Ketrzynski). The word “public” is used in some translations of both the
Polish and Soviet Constitutions. For example, see this version of the Polish Constitution:
KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] 1952, art. 69 (Pol.),
http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/kpol/e1952a-r7.html [https://perma.cc/6A9E-BGQ3].
231. See Letter from Morris B. Abram to George Goodwin (Dec. 23, 1963) (on file with
MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 9) [hereinafter Abram-Goodwin Letter]; U.N. ESCOR,
Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, 16th Sess., 410th mtg. at 7,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.410 (Feb. 7, 1964).
232. Ivanov and Ketrzynski, supra note 178, at 2–3.
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counterpart, mandated that states “ensure equality for all before the
law,” eliminate racial discrimination in protecting political and civil
rights, provide effective remedies regardless of race, and guarantee
equal access to recreational and public facilities—“including
restaurants, hotels, cinemas, [and] parks.”233 The Soviet-Polish draft
also included a provision that mirrored the U.S. members’ call for
affirmative action.234 Under the proviso, which drew inspiration from
Soviet experience managing a multiethnic state and educating Third
World college students, state parties to the Convention were “to
provide the training of skilled manpower and expert personnel from
among the groups of population formerly deprived of the right to
education.”235 Those similarities between the competing drafts were
irrefutable, but they also ended here.
The Soviet-Polish draft dwarfed the United States’ proposal.
Article II of the Eastern bloc’s draft additionally called on states to end
racial discrimination in a wide range of economic, social, and cultural
rights—including “the right to form and join trade unions,” “to
employment and equal pay,” to education, to housing, and to “public
health, medical care[,] and social security.”236 If the Eastern bloc’s long
catalog of prohibitions was not enough, Article II of their draft also
declared that state parties to the Convention must prohibit all “acts or
manifestations of racial discrimination of any kind.”237 There was no
question about the Eastern bloc’s commitment to racial justice, at least
on paper. Its proposed Convention made the United States look weak
before the human rights community.
The Soviet and Polish experts’ views prohibiting all “acts or
manifestations of racial discrimination of any kind” were explosive.238

233. Id.
234. Id. at 3; Suggested Draft for CERD, supra note 177, at 2–3.
235. Ivanov and Ketrzynski, supra note 178, at 3; MARTIN, supra note 180, at 1 (asserting that
the Soviet Union “was the first of the old European multiethnic states to confront the rising tide
of nationalism and respond by systematically promoting the national consciousness of its ethnic
minorities and establishing for them many of the characteristic institutional forms of the nationstate”); Katsakioris, supra note 180, at 145 (noting that in 1960 Khrushchev opened the People’s
Friendship University shortly thereafter renamed Patrice Lumumba University dedicated to
educating “students from Asian, African, and Latin American countries”).
236. Ivanov and Ketrzynski, supra note 178, at 3.
237. Id. at 2.
238. Id. For one explosive moment, see U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm’n on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, 16th Sess., 409th mtg. at 6–8, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.409 (Jan. 15, 1964). The Eastern experts asserted that a Convention truly
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Early in the Convention debates, the Sub-Commission’s experts had
agreed to delay the discussions of one manifestation of racial
discrimination—group defamation, the most controversial issue during
the Declaration and Convention debates.239 Even with that difficulty
temporarily sidelined, Article II of the Soviet-Polish proposal went
well beyond Abram and Ferguson’s proposed treaty, which was
developed in line with the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
concept.240 Under the state action doctrine, the equal protection clause
only applied to government entities.241 Yet Abram and Ferguson
privately confessed that there remained unambiguous areas of law
where state actors still denied U.S. citizens equal protection of the law,
such as state miscegenation statutes.242

worthy of its name should prohibit any racist manifestation and that racist manifestations often
became much larger human rights problems. Id. at 7–8. However, the U.S. draft did not seek to
end all racist manifestations, particularly in the private sphere. Id. at 7. The Eastern experts used
this ostensible contradiction as a way to attack the United States for being weak in the fight
against racism. Ketrzynski blasted Abram for producing an “inadequate” draft that protected
racist advocacy. Id. Ketrzynski argued, “Hitler had advocated racist doctrines long before he had
passed to action” and “the apartheid faction in South Africa . . . engaged in racist propaganda for
many years and had conducted political campaigns for that policy.” Id. at 7–8. Ketrzynski
maintained that had these states taken action earlier against racist manifestations, neither Hitler
nor the apartheid government would have been able to come to power. See id. For Ketrzynski, if
the Sub-Commission adopted the United States’ approach to regulating racism, the SubCommission would create a legal framework that would, ironically, allow the worst types of racism
to flourish. See id.
239. See U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm’n on the Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of
Minorities, 16th Sess., 412th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.412 (Jan. 15, 1964) [hereinafter
Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg.]; see also Mr. Abram: Suggested Draft, supra note 186, at 1 (“No State
Party shall permit its officials or any agency or organization supported in whole or in part by
government funds to promote and incite racial hatred, nor shall it grant a franchise or license . . .
for the purpose of promoting and inciting to racial hatred.”).
240. See Guidance Paper, supra note 20, at 4; Ivanov and Ketrzynski, supra note 178, at 2.
241. E.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
242. Comments by Dean Clyde Ferguson, Jr. (Morris Abram concurring) on Sub-Comm’n
Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination - Preamble and
Substantive Articles 4 (Jan. 30, 1964) (on file with MARBL, Abram Papers, Folder 94, Box 9). In
Ferguson’s memorandum to the State Department, he wrote, “While the Supreme Court has not
yet passed on the validity of miscegenation statutes, it is clear that such State laws are
unconstitutional.” Id. He then cited for this proposition a prediction he made regarding antimiscegenation laws in Desegregation and the Law, the book he had co-authored. Id.; see
BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 93, at 22–23 (asserting that the Supreme Court would
eventually decide the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws and that Brown “offere[d]
insight into the trend of decision which will prevail in the future”). The U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated state bans on interracial marriage three years after Ferguson submitted this
memorandum to the State Department. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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More significantly, the U.S. draft’s equal protection framework
left private discrimination virtually unscathed.243 Private discrimination
was rampant in essential areas of U.S. life, such as healthcare, housing,
and employment, a fact of which the U.S. experts were keenly aware.244
In fact, Abram and Ferguson had become racial statesmen due to each
man’s willingness to confront well-entrenched forms of public and
private discrimination.245 Furthermore, the U.S. experts acknowledged
that given the resounding demands for justice heard throughout the
world, many hoped the Convention would cover both public and
private discrimination.246 Abram and Ferguson, however, also
understood the nuanced context of the draft proposals and the Cold
War dynamics operating in the background. They were at the United
Nations to promote U.S. foreign policy interests as part and parcel to
their efforts, not to expose the limitations of U.S. constitutional law or
gift the Eastern bloc with new sources of credible fodder.
A serious tension emerged. On one hand, while the U.S. draft was
imperfect, it could nonetheless enhance the human rights protections
offered to millions throughout the world. If adopted, the treaty would
guarantee other countries’ citizens no less than what the United States
guaranteed its own citizens. Adopting the U.S. draft would also place
the United States at the forefront of racial progress and help limit the
Soviet Union’s advances with hollow calls for equality.
At the same time, centering the Convention on the Equal
Protection Clause seemed woefully inadequate and even inappropriate
considering the express mission of the race treaty. The state action

243. Ferguson reiterated this point in an often-overlooked reflection on the Convention’s
legislative history. He wrote, “[T]he convention is comprehensive as it applies to discrimination
in public life,” as the construction of the term “public life” reflects “the intent of the drafters of
the convention to comprehend something like our conception of state action, and to reserve some
area of privacy . . . .” Ferguson, CERD, supra note 19, at 43.
244. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); see CIVIL RIGHTS ‘63, supra note 190
passim.
245. For examples of Abram’s leadership in the attack on public and private discrimination,
see ABRAM, supra note 12, at 153–54, which discusses his work to end racial discrimination in
public accommodations and criminal justice and how his leadership in civil rights led to President
Lyndon B. Johnson naming him co-chair of the White House Conference on Civil Rights. For an
example of Ferguson’s leadership in the attack on public and private discrimination, see generally
CIVIL RIGHTS ‘63, supra note 193. In the report, the Commission criticizes public and private
discrimination in areas including education, employment, housing, the administration of justice,
and health, and the Commission then offers recommendations to end public and private
discrimination in each area. Id. passim.
246. See, e.g., Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 69–70.
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requirement of the Equal Protection Clause had often frustrated racial
progress in the United States, as it recast private discrimination as
constitutionally permissible, politically acceptable, and morally
defensible behavior. Admittedly, the Soviet Union’s draft, like the
Soviet Constitution, made legal promises the country did not actually
deliver to its own citizens. But the U.S. draft threatened to export a
legal problem that had long stood in the way of achieving true racial
progress in the United States.
The Eastern bloc seized on the state action limitation, declaring
that the concept was an unacceptable regression from the protections
in the original Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination.247 The Soviet expert, Boris Ivanov, gave pointed
commentary highlighting the tensions between the United States’
rhetoric and the limited protections offered by the U.S. draft. Under
the Declaration, “No State, institution, group[,] or individual [could]
make any discrimination whatsoever in matters of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the treatment of persons, groups of persons[,]
or institutions on the ground of race, colour[,] or ethnic origin.”248 The
U.S. draft, however, would only prohibit discrimination by the State
and thus would leave private racism unchecked.249 The equal
protection framework restricted the reach of the U.S. draft, and the
Soviets knew it.
The Eastern bloc’s draft did not contain this limitation; instead, it
would prohibit any “acts or manifestations of racial discrimination of
any kind” within a State’s territory.250 Ivanov continued to insist that
merely limiting state discrimination would be inadequate.251 There
were too many “passive” states that some Sub-Commission members
were attempting to placate.252 The General Assembly had adopted the
247. Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg., supra note 239, at 8.
248. G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII), supra note 53, at 36.
249. See Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg., supra note 239, at 8. Ivanov contended that Abram’s draft
was “unacceptable” and “represented a backward step in relation to the Declaration” because
the draft “would leave the door open to discrimination and racism by giving the State the role of
a mere observer.” Id.
250. Ivanov and Ketrzynski, supra note 178, at 2.
251. Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg., supra note 239, at 8.
252. For members of the Eastern bloc, nations like the United States were too “passive” in
their approaches to ending racial discrimination. See id. Wojciech Ketrzynski also criticized Peter
Calvocoressi, the U.K. expert on the Sub-Commission, for failing to support a broad mandate to
end “manifestations of racial discrimination of any kind.” Id. at 2, 9. Furthermore, Calvocoressi
looked “passive” in the fight against racism after he submitted a draft Convention which targeted
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Declaration, Ivanov argued, that “expressly said that racism must be
ended.”253 He believed that the Eastern bloc’s bold draft was thus a
“logical sequel to [the] Declaration,” and so his conclusion was simple:
replace “Mr. Abram’s draft of article II” with “article II as submitted
by Mr. Ketrzynski and himself.”254
The Soviet’s impassioned remarks were the types of affronts that
Abram had come to expect. Ivanov’s tone was not per se out of line,
and his penetrating analysis of the primary text before the SubCommission was a completely valid exercise of his duties as an expert.
What exasperated Abram was Ivanov’s empty self-righteousness, or
what Abram perceived as such. Abram found that the Russian expert
taunted him about glaring inequities in the United States.255 This
frustrated Abram because he knew that U.S. society “could stand
inspection, [while] Soviet society could not.”256 The Soviets’ human
rights record was, without question, abysmal,257 and Abram spent much
of his time on the Sub-Commission proving the Soviets’ “pious denials”
of institutionalized discrimination in the U.S.S.R. wrong—while
attempting to honor U.N. protocol by addressing general and not
country-specific human rights violations.258 Nonetheless, in 1964,
Abram and Ivanov began a year-long battle over the Soviet
commitment to ending all forms of discrimination after the Ukrainian
Academy of Science published Judaism Without Embellishment.259 The
book “resembled a reprint of Julius Streicher’s Der Stürmer,” a Nazi
newspaper of the early and mid-twentieth century with violent anti-

state-sponsored discrimination and not private discrimination. See U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm’n
on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, Mr. Calvocoressi: Draft Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination at 2–3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.309
(Jan. 13, 1964).
253. Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg., supra note 239, at 8.
254. Id.
255. ABRAM, supra note 12, at 153.
256. Id. at 152–53.
257. See generally, e.g., Decter, supra note 175, at 420 (“[The Soviet nationalities policy was]
based on the ideological acceptance of the concept of national self-determination and on the legal
recognition of the right of all nationalities within Soviet borders to cultural freedom. Actual
Soviet policy toward the Jews clearly violate[d] these principles.”).
258. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 151–53 (discussing Abram’s struggle against anti-Semitism
in the U.S.S.R.).
259. See id. at 151–52 (writing that he “had gotten hold of a book entitled Judaism Without
Embellishment” and was “soon directly embroiled in a struggle against institutionalized antiSemitism in the USSR”).
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Semitic imagery.260 For Abram and other human rights watchers, the
state-sponsored press’ willingness to print the book and to deny that
“the crudest imaginable caricatures of Jews polluted [the book’s]
pages” epitomized the Soviet Union’s hollow calls for equality.261 Yet,
given the Sub-Commission’s rules, many of these topics never bubbled
to the surface of the Convention debates. The Soviets offered straightfaced denials about human rights abuses, and Ivanov feigned sincerity
about ensuring total equality, while also criticizing the U.S. human
rights record.262
C. The Full Sub-Commission Considers the Drafts
The session reached a feverish pitch between the two global
superpowers. Other countries attempted to intervene in the clash,
though each joined for their own political motivations as well. Arcot
Krishnaswami, the Sub-Commission’s expert from India, attempted to
calm the situation by constructing a compromise text.263 Krishnaswami
had spent much of his life watching human rights battles between
global superpowers, and his father was one of the “architects of the
U.N. Charter.”264 Krishnaswami proposed that the Soviet and U.S.
drafts be combined, reconciling the two points of view.265 But the U.S.
delegation saw this suggestion as far from a compromise; the amended
text would still require states to prohibit racial discrimination in private
life.266
The U.K. delegation, too, found the compromise unacceptable.
Peter Calvocoressi, the Sub-Commission’s expert from the United
Kingdom, simply “did not think that the two viewpoints were

260. Id.; RANDALL L. BYTWERK, JULIUS STREICHER: NAZI EDITOR OF THE NOTORIOUS
ANTI-SEMITIC NEWSPAPER DER STÜRMER 171 (Cooper Square Press 2001) (1983).
261. ABRAM, supra note 12, at 151–52. One 1935 issue, for instance, featured replies from
readers in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Great Britain, Greece, Paraguay, and the United States.
BYTWERK, supra note 260, at 172. The controversy over Judaism Without Embellishment became
such an international embarrassment for the Soviets “that the Communist Party Ideological
Commission took the very rare initiative of condemning the book as a ‘serious mistake.’”
WILLIAM KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: “A
CURIOUS GRAPEVINE” 67 (Palgrave 2001) (1998). Khrushchev eventually removed the antiSemitic text from bookstands. Id.
262. ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–53.
263. Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg., supra note 239, at 2, 8.
264. Abram-Goodwin Letter, supra note 231, at 2.
265. Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg., supra note 239, at 8.
266. See id. at 13.
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reconcilable.”267 Calvocoressi feared that State prohibition of “all acts
and manifestations of racial discrimination” could also “endanger
freedom of thought, opinion[,] and expression.”268 The British
barrister’s retreat to a defense of free speech was predictable. At first
blush, Calvocoressi’s comments seemed to be a principled move to
safeguard rights recognized under Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.269 Calvocoressi’s free speech defenses,
however, were a mere pretext. The members of the Sub-Commission
had already agreed to delay the debates over regulation of hate speech
and organizations.270 It was eminently possible, for example, to ban all
forms of racial discrimination with a hate-speech exception.
The real issue for the U.K. delegation was that Article II of the
Soviet-Polish draft posed serious legislative problems for the United
Kingdom. There was no hiding that racism was endemic to British rule.
In parts of the South Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, the
crumbling empire still clutched tightly to some remaining colonial
territories and abdicated legal responsibility for settlers crushing
popular uprisings in indirectly ruled lands.271 In the North Atlantic,
postwar immigrants to Britain found employment, education, and
housing discrimination in abundance.272 London’s rapidly growing
Black communities were victims not only of racial riots but also
widespread police misconduct.273 Money often could not even buy
immigrants better accommodations. Immigrants simply confronted
crude signs with clear messages: “‘NO BLACKS[,]’ . . . ‘NO DOGS.’”274
And in 1963, as Dr. King crusaded in the streets of Birmingham,
Alabama, a multiracial coalition of African, Asian, and Caribbean
267. Id. at 2, 8.
268. Id. at 8–9.
269. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 74–75 (Dec. 10, 1948).
270. See Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg., supra note 239, at 6; see also Mr. Abram: Suggested Draft,
supra note 186, at 1 (“No State Party shall permit its officials or any agency or organization
supported in whole or in part by government funds to promote and incite racial hatred, nor shall
it grant a franchise or license . . . for the purpose of promoting and inciting to racial hatred.”).
271. See generally JAN C. JANSEN & JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL, DECOLONIZATION: A SHORT
HISTORY (Jeremiah Riemer trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2017) (2013) (describing colonialism’s
demise).
272. See CAROLE BOYCE DAVIES, LEFT OF KARL MARX: THE POLITICAL LIFE OF BLACK
COMMUNIST CLAUDIA JONES 82, 86–88 (2008).
273. See id. at 88, 92–93; KENNETTA HAMMOND PERRY, LONDON IS THE PLACE FOR ME:
BLACK BRITONS, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 7 (2015).
274. PEARSON NURSE, MY JOURNEY THROUGH RACISM: NO IRISH, NO BLACKS, NO DOGS:
BEING BRIGHT BUT NOT CLEVER 26 (2011).
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immigrants, who had followed King’s meteoric rise to global
prominence, launched their own protests in Bristol, England.275 The
Bristol Bus Boycott, styled after the Montgomery Bus Boycott,
attracted worldwide sympathies to the dismay of British officials.276
In the British Foreign Office’s private discussions of the
Convention, officials routinely confessed that the empire would be
unable to immediately cease all manifestations of racial
discrimination.277 It seemed impractical, foolhardy, and, in many ways,
a complete disregard to the British way of life. The private
conversations disclosed that, while the British officials believed that
their government could encourage ending racial discrimination in the
private sphere, eliminating private, entrenched prejudices would be
difficult.278 The British government’s approach to racial justice was
equal parts defeatism, unwillingness, and bald racism.279 The British

275. MADGE DRESSER, BLACK AND WHITE ON THE BUSES: THE 1963 COLOUR BAR
DISPUTE IN BRISTOL 15–17, 27 (1986) (discussing the connections between the King-led protests
and the Bristol protests). For early news coverage of the U.K. boycott, see Bus Boycott by West
Indians: Company’s Refusal To Employ Man, TIMES (London), May 3, 1963, at 11. Perhaps,
equally interesting, the Bristol Bus Boycott officially ended on August 28, 1963, the same day as
the March on Washington. Bus Crew Colour Bar Ends, TIMES (London), Aug. 29, 1963, at 6;
March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, STANFORD: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. RSCH. &
EDUC. INST., https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/march-washington-jobs-and-freedom
[https://perma.cc/D8Z5-6LHT].
276. Cf. Bus Boycott by West Indians: Company’s Refusal To Employ Man, supra note 275,
at 11 (noting that officials “of Trinidad and Tobago were in the city inquiring into the dispute”).
277. See, e.g., Memorandum from C.A. Axworthy, Colonial Off., to M.T. Pill, Esq., Foreign
Off. 1–4 (June 23, 1964) (on file with Population and Discrimination: Sub-Comm’n on
Discrimination, National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom, FO 371/178331) (discussing a series
of conversations on racial problems throughout the empire, including “‘European only’ clubs and
hotels,” racially separate voting rolls, European over-representation in overseas legislatures,
employment discrimination, potential housing discrimination, and segregated education);
Memorandum from C.A. Axworthy, Colonial Off., to M.T. Pill, Esq., Foreign Off. 1 (July 2, 1964)
(on file with Population and Discrimination: Sub-Comm’n on Discrimination, National Archives,
Kew, United Kingdom, FO 371/178331) (conceding that Fiji “presents an insuperable [barrier] to
ratification of the Convention” and emphasizing that “it is not possible to foresee the time when
racial attitudes in the Colony will have changed sufficiently to permit the ending of discriminatory
practices”).
278. See, e.g., Memorandum from Ministry of Labour to M. Pill, Esq., United Nations Dep’t,
Foreign Off. 2 (Feb. 10, 1964) (on file with Population and Discrimination: Sub-Comm’n on
Discrimination, National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom, FO 371/178331) [hereinafter LabourPill Letter] (describing a series of conversations on difficulties of ending discrimination in private
employment, including instances where there was “sheer prejudice”).
279. See, e.g., Memorandum from Home Office to M. Pill Esq. Foreign Office (June 22, 1964)
(on file with Population and Discrimination: Sub-Comm’n on Discrimination, National Archives,
Kew, United Kingdom, FO 371/178331). In the memo, British officials called the Convention draft
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Office, nonetheless, urged Calvocoressi “to display a positive attitude
towards the drafting of [the] convention” because it would “stand us in
good stead if we are compelled later in the year to express serious
reservations” on the Convention.280 The British Office aimed to
prevent communists and extreme anticolonialists’ efforts to draft a
convention which could “obscure the distinction between racial
discrimination and colonialism” and “damage British interests vis-à-vis
our dependent territories.”281 Publicly, Calvocoressi served Her
Majesty’s Government well;282 his tall, emotionless face betrayed no
confidence. He could be sure that revealing Britain’s insecurities and
willingness to harbor racism would not endear the body of experts to
his government’s positions.
Beyond the United Kingdom, the Sub-Commission’s expert from
the Philippines, Judge José Inglés, also entered the debate, arguing that
the broader Soviet draft was preferable to the United States’ draft.283
Inglés was a longtime Sub-Commission expert who had served as the
body’s chairman, vice chairman, and special rapporteur.284 He had
demonstrated such commitment to ending discrimination that, at
times, he was willing to defy the Sub-Commission’s protocol, expose
“unacceptable” because “legislation would be required to implement [the] provisions” of the
draft. Id. The Home Office stressed that the British “Government remain[s] of the view that
legislation would be undesirable and . . . it would not be practicable to draft legislation to prevent
racial discrimination which would be effective and enforceable.” Id.
280. Steering Comm. on Int’l Orgs., Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot.
of Minorities (Jan. 11, 1964), Population and Discrimination: Sub-Comm’n on Discrimination,
National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom, FO 371/178331 (quoting “The United Kingdom
Objective”).
281. Id. (emphasis omitted).
282. See generally Peter Calvocoressi & Roger Adelson, Interview with Peter Calvocoressi, 55
HISTORIAN 235 (1993) (describing his career in international relations). Calvocoressi was a
former British intelligence officer who broke foreign codes in Bletchley Park, id. at 242, and given
the sensitivity of the British government’s memoranda, he was certain not to reveal them to the
full Sub-Commission. Throughout the Convention’s negotiations, the British underscored the
need to conceal their government’s inability to end private discrimination. See, e.g., Labour-Pill
Letter, supra note 278, at 2 (privately admitting Britain’s weak approach to ending “sheer
prejudice” in private employment and even reminding the Foreign Office that the government’s
“approach to the problem of discrimination is not one which could be published or should be
discussed before the Human Rights Commission,” the Sub-Commission’s parent body).
283. See Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg., supra note 239, at 2, 9 (preferring a draft that “would place
the State under the obligation of refraining from all acts of discrimination itself and forbidding
such acts by others”); Abram-Goodwin Letter, supra note 231.
284. Brief Biographies of Sub-Commission Members (on file with National Archives, College
Park, Md., Central Foreign Policy Files, Record Group 59, Box 550, Folder 341.707/5-1860)
(listing Inglés’ professional accomplishments).
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country-specific bigotry, and shame human rights abusers on the
international stage, the United States included.285 Inglés reminded the
Sub-Commission that it already had a drafting guide in the
Declaration, and that the Declaration, like the Soviet draft, targeted
the actions of “States, institutions, groups[,] and individuals.”286
The Sub-Commission’s chairman, Hernán Santa Cruz, agreed
with the Judge’s observations.287 The chairman counseled the SubCommission’s members to remember the fundamental ideas of the
Declaration in drafting and “prepar[ing] a truly effective instrument,
capable of achieving the purposes set out in the Declaration.”288 To that
end, Santa Cruz emphasized that the U.S. draft was inadequate in
preventing private discrimination.289 He also, however, seemed to
recognize Abram’s dilemma as the U.S. expert. Santa Cruz maintained
that although Abram was not formally a U.S. government
representative, the legal questions before the Sub-Commission were
“extremely complicated and could [leave] certain States Parties to the
Convention with many constitutional problems and problems of
domestic legislation.”290 Nonetheless, the chairman felt that those
problems should not be Abram’s concerns or the concerns of any
member of the Sub-Commission, since the Sub-Commission was a
group of independent experts tasked with “prohibit[ing] all acts of
discrimination.”291
Abram’s allies rose to his defense despite Santa Cruz’s
admonishment. Voitto Saario, the Sub-Commission’s expert from
Finland, objected to the mounting criticisms of the U.S. draft.292 Saario
claimed that the U.S. draft mirrored the Declaration because both
dealt with a state obligation not to discriminate.293 Likewise, Francesco
285. For more on Inglés’ willingness to take public notice of facts outside of official
government accounts, see generally José D. Inglés, Study of Discrimination in Respect of the Right
of Everyone To Leave Any Country, Including His Own, and To Return to His Country, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/229/Rev.1 (1963). Throughout the report, Inglés examined general and
country-specific accounts of discrimination, and he even publicized an account of how the United
States violated the human rights of a prominent civil rights activist and journalist. See id. at 30.
286. Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg., supra note 239, at 9.
287. Id. at 2, 10.
288. Id. at 10.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 2, 10.
293. See id. at 10.
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Capotorti, the Sub-Commission’s special rapporteur and expert from
Italy, “recalled for the benefit of Mr. Ingl[é]s” that a convention was
not legally equivalent to a declaration under international law.294 A
convention was legally binding and thus required a more precise
formulation of obligations than a declaration.295 Capotorti’s patience
was growing thin due to the extended and, at times, unfocused series
of arguments in the plenary session.296 He wanted the Sub-Commission
to be decisive on the issue of state action against private
discrimination.297 Thus, Capotorti, a well-regarded professor of
international law from Naples, mapped two routes for the SubCommission’s future discussions. On one hand, the Sub-Commission
could adopt “an instrument which could be accepted by the greatest
number of States, and hence the necessity to adopt as flexible a
formulation as possible.”298 On the other hand, real progress would
require “a more rigid and precise formulation.”299 Capotorti proposed
that the rigid formulation should be applied to forbid state
discrimination, while the flexible formulation could be employed for
private discrimination.300
Ivanov held the line, however, insisting that a flexible
formulation—Abram’s formulation—would not effectively prohibit
racial discrimination. Ivanov insisted that the Soviet-Polish draft would
remove the state from “the role of mere observer,” compelling it “to
promise that it would adopt the necessary measures to deal with racial
discrimination.”301 But Abram countered this point.302 Despite having
remained relatively quiet during the debates, attempting to not appear
defensive or apologetic for the U.S. draft, he believed that the federal
government was taking great strides to end racial discrimination—

294. Id. at 11.
295. See Keane, supra note 49, at 368, 374–77.
296. See Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg., supra note 239, at 11 (noting that Capotorti asserted “that
the time had come for the Sub-Commission to define its stand” and be specific on measures
around the state action issue).
297. See id. (noting that the Sub-Commission must focus on “the question of the measures to
be taken by the State against individuals who practi[c]ed discrimination”).
298. Id. at 12.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 13.
302. Id.
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despite the limitations caused by state action doctrine.303 Furthermore,
he found many of the criticisms of his Article II draft “were
unwarranted if the document as a whole was taken into account.”304
Abram was adamant that states should not intervene in the private
lives of individuals. He was firmly convinced that both the norms, as
set forth in the Declaration, and education should work to end private
discrimination.305
The Sub-Commission’s debate had reached a stalemate. Francisco
Cuevas Cancino, the expert from Mexico, was aggravated by the
direction of the drafting session.306 The Sub-Commission had “take[n]
Mr. Abram’s text as a basis for its work,” Cuevas Cancino sighed, but
now the Sub-Commission was using other members’ drafts as the basis
for the group’s work.307 The day was already late,308 and the SubCommission had found a way to become preoccupied with a mere
fraction of its agenda.
Moreover, Ivanov and Ketrzynski had commandeered the
debates. Abram and Ferguson seemed stuck. The Soviet and Polish
experts had executed their drafting coup by presenting the Eastern
bloc’s proposal after the Sub-Commission’s session was well
underway.309 It gave the U.S. members no time to study the SovietPolish draft or prepare well-considered rebuttals. The Eastern bloc, in
turn, had kept Soviet anti-Semitism out of the spotlight while now
taking the moral and legal high ground in the race debate.310
D. Peering Behind the Convention’s Travaux Préparatoires
The impasse over Article II and resulting delay in the drafting
progress had been one of the State Department’s main concerns going
into the 1964 session.311 The protracted debates over the Convention
were reducing the time allotted to drafting the Declaration on

303. See ABRAM, supra note 12, at 152–53 (describing Abram’s broad approach to Soviet
criticisms of shortcomings in U.S. democracy).
304. Sub-Comm’n 412 mtg., supra note 239, at 13.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 2, 13–14.
307. Id. at 13–14.
308. Id. at 14.
309. See supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text.
310. Guidance Paper, supra note 20, at 3 (discussing the Soviet’s strategy to postpone and
prevent discussion on religious discrimination).
311. Id.
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Religious Intolerance. The Bureau of International Organizations
surmised that this was part of the Eastern bloc’s plan for the SubCommission’s 1964 session.312 The Bureau wanted drafts on both
subjects available for the General Assembly’s consideration in the fall.
As a means of achieving this, the Bureau suggested that working
groups should meet outside the Sub-Commission’s formal sessions to
discuss the subject.313 In these working groups, members could avoid
the Sub-Commission’s puritanical rules and hash out their real
differences. These conversations were deeply ideological, often
indecorous, and, perhaps most important, off the public record.314
Additionally, many of the Sub-Commission’s experts took themselves
and their U.N.-designated titles quite seriously. The Bureau informed
Abram and Ferguson that they should use these working groups to
create understandings with and counter possible opposition among the
other experts.315
As the working group prepared to meet off the record, Abram and
Ferguson responded to the Eastern bloc’s draft with a plan that allowed
the United States to take an equally bold stance without offending U.S.
constitutional law. The U.S. experts developed a theory that a
reasonable reading of Article I of the Soviet-Polish draft would allow
a state party to the Convention to define racial discrimination as only
race-based infringements on public life. As Ferguson later explained,
this language—introduced by Ivanov—prohibited “discrimination in
‘political, economic, social, cultural[,] or any other field of public
life. . . .’”316 Ferguson believed that the U.S. policymakers could

312. Id. The Bureau’s guidance paper insisted that “[o]n the question of priorities, the
drafting of the convention on racial discrimination should not be allowed to delay or crowd out
completion of the declaration on religious intolerance.” Id. The paper further instructed that
“[u]nless the draft Declaration against Religious Intolerance is discussed in the General Assembly
in advance of, or at the same time as the second (convention) stage of its action on race
discrimination, there is danger that problems of religious discrimination may be pushed aside as
of less significance.” Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.; see 1963 Nason-Abram Letter, supra note 18.
316. Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 69 (alteration in original); see Ivanov and
Ketrzynski, supra note 178, at 2; see also U.S. Position on Articles Adopted by the Human Rights
Commission at its 1964 Session, on the U.S. Proposal for an Additional Article on Anti-Semitism
and Soviet Amendments Thereto 3 (May 12, 1964) (on file with MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94,
Folder 9) [hereinafter U.S. Position on Articles Adopted] (explaining their intention to keep the
limited definition of discrimination). State Department officials would later write:
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interpret the grammatical ambiguity inherent in “any other field of
public life” in a way that would cover for U.S. constitutional
shortcomings caused by the state action doctrine.317 This ambiguity
could mean either that the ban on discrimination covers only fields of
public life or that “both public and private fields are covered respecting
economic, social and cultural affairs, but beyond these enumerated
fields only rights respecting public affairs are covered.”318 Ferguson
reiterated, “[T]he ambiguity is of critical import to the United
States.”319
If the phrase “other field of public life” could be construed as only
prohibiting public discrimination, then the draft Convention arguably
conformed to the obligations already imposed by the U.S.
Constitution. And, though odious, private discrimination did not
violate the U.S. Constitution or the Convention. Furthermore, the
provision in the Soviet-Polish draft that mandated nondiscrimination
in economic, social, and cultural rights would not cause the United
States legal problems under the U.S. Constitution or the Convention.
The U.S. Constitution did not guarantee economic, social, or cultural
rights; thus, even if the Convention prohibited state-sponsored
discrimination in economic, social, and cultural rights, the United
States could not violate Convention in this way because no person in
the United States had any of these rights, regardless of race.320
Consequently, the U.S. delegation had successfully crafted an
interpretation of the Convention to comport with the state action
doctrine.
The Convention’s private–public divide posed a similar
conceptual problem for Peter Calvocoressi. Behind closed doors,
officials in London worried that the draft Convention might contain

A principal U.S. objective is to retain the present definition limiting the application of
the convention to discrimination in fields of “public life.” This was proposed in the
Subcommission by the Soviet member . . . . The Delegation should avoid focusing
attention on this important phrase, but if any substantial move develops to eliminate
it, the Delegation should strongly resist such revision.
U.S. Position on Articles Adopted, supra.
317. Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 69 (emphasis omitted).
318. Id.
319. Id.; see also Comments by Dean Clyde Ferguson, Jr., supra note 242, at 2–3 (discussing
the meaning of “public” in Article II of the Convention and arguing that where “public” means
“the State and all its organs,” it “is clearly consistent with U.S. Constitutional Law”).
320. See Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 69; Comments by Dean Clyde
Ferguson, Jr., supra note 242, at 2–3.
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elements like the Declaration that would force governments to
legislate to end racism in the private sphere.321 Racial discrimination in
areas like public accommodations posed the same troubles for the
British government as it did for the U.S. government. The British had
not yet adopted the Race Relations Act of 1965,322 and the civil rights
bill then before the U.S. Congress was stalled. The proposed U.S.
legislation still needed another forty signatures.323 The British turned
to English and Commonwealth law to explain its position on its public
accommodations problem. “Every person does have an equal right to
access to any public place,” the Foreign Office acknowledged,
“although in some cases the person responsible for that place may, at
his discretion, exclude him.”324 Yet, this position was becoming
unpopular around the world and could easily be construed as hostile to
the spirit of and social movements behind the race treaty.
The British government instructed Calvocoressi to “maintain
close contact during debate . . . with other interested and friendly
members,” and he did precisely that.325 The British and the U.S.
members on the Sub-Commission aligned their strategies. Calvocoressi
was Abram’s closest ally on the Sub-Commission. The two had known
each other since the Nuremberg trials,326 and perhaps more importantly
here, they had the same national interests. During the private meeting
between Calvocoressi, Abram, and Ferguson, the U.S. members
shared their reading of the draft Convention. The British diplomat was
impressed by their argument, and officials back in London were too.327
The British Foreign Office beamed:

321. Steering Comm. on Int’l Orgs., Sub-Comm’n on Prevention Discrimination and Prot. of
Minorities (Jan. 11, 1964), Population and Discrimination: Sub-Comm’n on Discrimination,
National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom, FO 371/178331; see ECOSOC, Draft Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (June 30, 1964) (on file with National
Archives, Kew, United Kingdom, Population and Discrimination: Sub-Commission on
Discrimination, FO 371/178331) [hereinafter ECOSOC].
322. See generally Race Relations Act 1965 c. 73 § 1 (Eng.) (outlawing racial discrimination
in places of public resort).
323. NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS: LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, MARTIN LUTHER KING
JR., AND THE LAWS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 92 (2005).
324. ECOSOC, supra note 321.
325. Tactics (1964) (on file with National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom, Population and
Discrimination: Sub-Commission on Discrimination, FO 371/178330).
326. Abram-Goodwin Letter, supra note 231, at 1.
327. Calvocoressi Report, supra note 183, at 1; ECOSOC, supra note 321.
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The expression “public life” is extremely useful as part of this
definition. We should maintain it. Its effect is to turn the Draft
Convention into one of racial discrimination in public life. The line
between what is public and what is private might be extremely
difficult to draw. For example, what is a Golf Club or a Political
Party?328

The Foreign Office also recommended that the U.K. delegation to the
United Nations take the United States’ approach in the Convention’s
future negotiations and to narrowly interpret “public life.”329
Beneath the bluster, the U.S. and British members were quietly
hatching their plan. Certainly, Calvocoressi’s demonstrated
commitment to racial equality was less than that of either Abram or
Ferguson. Yet, their national interests converged. When Abram and
Calvocoressi joined the working group on Article I, they carved out a
compromise. The group agreed that there would be no ban on all
“manifestations” of racial discrimination under Article I of the draft
Convention, but Abram and Calvocoressi caved to Ivanov and
Ketrzynski’s definition of racial discrimination.330 With all delegations
satisfied by this compromise, the Chairman put Article I to vote. The
newly drafted language declared the following:
In this Convention[,] the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
national[,] or ethnic origin . . . which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment[,] or exercise of
human rights and freedoms in political, economic, social, cultural[,]
or any other field of public life set forth inter alia in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.331

The working group’s amendment unanimously passed, and the SubCommission broke for the weekend.332
Early on Monday morning, eight Sub-Commission members
spoke in succession to address the implications of the winding Article

328. ECOSOC, supra note 321.
329. Id.
330. See Rep. of Sixteenth Session, supra note 230, at 22.
331. See id.
332. See U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm’n on the Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of
Minorities, 16th Sess., 414th mtg. at 10, 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.414 (Jan. 17, 1964)
[hereinafter Sub-Comm’n mtg. 414].
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I debates.333 Mohammed Mudawi and Arcot Krishnaswami reminded
the Sub-Commission that they should also be preparing a draft
“declaration on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance”
(the “Religious Declaration”).334 Just as the State Department had
feared, the race debates were crowding out the religion debates.
Mudawi and Krishnaswami suggested that the Sub-Commission take
up the Religious Declaration alongside the Convention.335 Ferguson,
sitting in the meeting as Abram’s alternate, concurred, suggesting that
the Convention work could continue in working groups, while the SubCommission meetings could focus on the Religious Declaration.336
Ferguson had merely repeated the instructions contained in the State
Department’s guidance paper and letter.337 José Inglés shared his
colleagues’ sentiments and proposed that the Sub-Commission could
extend its deliberations, if necessary, to complete work on both the
Religious Declaration and the Convention.338 Peter Calvocoressi, JeanMarcel Bouquin, Francesco Capotorti, and Mohammed Awad, the
Sub-Commission’s expert from the United Arab Republic, joined the
chorus.339 Capotorti urged members to collaborate privately over the
next two days to complete their drafts of the Religious Declaration.340
Awad endorsed Inglés’s recommendation that “the Sub-Commission
might extend its session for several days if necessary.”341 The
momentum on the Sub-Commission was shifting back to the United
States.
Ivanov’s indignation was palpable. The Soviet had countered,
seeking to push the Sub-Commission to conclude the Convention work
before beginning the Religious Declaration.342 He emphasized that the
General Assembly had stated, in no uncertain terms, that the
preparation of the Convention was its “absolute priority” and that

333. Id. at 1, 3–4.
334. See U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm’n on the Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of
Minorities, 16th Sess., 415th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.415 (Jan. 20, 1964) [hereinafter
Sub-Comm’n mtg. 415].
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See 1963 Nason-Abram Letter, supra note 18; Guidance Paper, supra note 20, at 3.
338. See Sub-Comm’n mtg. 415, supra note 334, at 3.
339. Id. at 2–4.
340. Id. at 4.
341. Id. at 3.
342. Id.
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ending racial discrimination “was the most important task before the
Sub-Commission.”343 But the Soviet’s efforts were in vain. The
chairman dismissed Ivanov’s plea based on the Sub-Commission’s
general agreement that discussion on the Religious Declaration should
begin.344 Debate of that proposal would soon begin.345 Ivanov’s
filibuster was nearing its end.
The Sub-Commission returned to its discussion of the draft
Convention. The experts endeavored to have much shorter discussions
of the articles, and as the body had already agreed, they would discuss
the articles in the order originally proposed by the United States. As
the Sub-Commission returned to discussions of Article II, each
delegation offered its own draft version. Article II of the Abram’s draft
read, “No State Party shall make any discrimination whatsoever
against persons, groups of persons or institutions on the grounds of
race, colour, or ethnic origin, or where applicable, on the basis of
‘nationality’ or national origin.”346 This provision outlined the
obligations of each state, struck a blow against Soviet discrimination,
and directly responded to Ivanov’s concern that states had to take an
active role in ending racial discrimination. Ivanov and Ketrzynski
responded with their own version of Article II, which declared, “Each
Contracting Party shall undertake to admit within its territory no acts
or manifestations of racial discrimination of any kind, and to provide
for, if appropriate, in its legislation, and implement, necessary
measures with a view to speedy elimination or [sic] racial
discrimination.”347 Calvocoressi and Capotorti offered their own draft
Article II, which stated, “Each Contracting State undertakes to pursue
by all appropriate means a policy of eliminating racial discrimination
in all its forms.”348 The provision maintained, “Each Contracting State
shall rigorously abstain from any act or practise of racial discrimination
and undertakes that all its legislative, executive, administrative[,] and
judicial organs, and also local authorities and public institutions of all

343. Id.
344. Id. at 4.
345. Id.
346. Rep. of Sixteenth Session, supra note 230, at 23.
347. Id. at 24. Earlier in the Convention debates, the Sub-Commission adopted a lengthy
preamble, which acknowledged the importance of the U.N. Charter, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, and other pertinent resolutions on racial discrimination. See id. at 16–21.
348. Id. at 25.
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kinds within its territory, shall act in conformity with this obligation.”349
It added, “No Contracting State shall encourage, advocate[,] or
support racial discrimination by any individual, group[,] or private
organization.”350
The Sub-Commission eventually chose the CalvocoressiCapotorti draft to serve as the basis for the Article II debates.351 The
language in the draft incorporated ideas from the U.S., Soviet, and
Polish members and tracked the state obligations under Article II of
the Declaration.352 Some of the Sub-Commission’s experts, however,
found Calvocoressi and Capotorti’s draft text still lacking. A flurry of
amendments followed.353
In the midst of these revisions, one key task remained for the
Western bloc: establish a reading of the Convention that might
conform to its respective constitutional obligations. The key, however,
was not to reopen the highly contentious and long-winded Article I
debates or reveal the bloc’s Article I strategy.354 Clyde Ferguson, on
behalf of the coalition, requested improvements to Article II that
avoided certain difficulties. These revisions included a clarification of
“local authorities” and “public institutions” to be defined as state
parties, thus limiting the Article’s scope to cover only state
discrimination.355 Ferguson additionally recommended that
Calvocoressi and Capotorti “delete[] the words ‘within its territory’” in
the draft.356 This change emphasized that state responsibility would

349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 26.
352. See U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, 16th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.324 (Feb. 11, 1964)
(draft of Calvocoressi and Capotorti). Article 2(2) of the Declaration states, “No State shall
encourage, advocate[,] or lend its support . . . to any discrimination based on race, colour[,] or
ethnic origin by any group, institution[,] or individual.” G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII), supra note 53,
art. 2(2).
353. See Rep. of Sixteenth Session, supra note 230, at 26–27.
354. See, e.g., Calvocoressi Report, supra note 183, at 1. The U.S. and the British experts had
established under Article I that a plausible reading of “racial discrimination” only required that
states end state-sponsored, racial discrimination. See, e.g., Comments by Dean Clyde Ferguson,
Jr., supra note 183, at 2–3. These experts surely did not want to revisit the Soviet mistake that
made the entire Convention much more palatable to the United States and United Kingdom.
355. See U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, 16th Sess., 416th mtg. at 4–5, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.416 (Jan. 20, 1964) [hereinafter Sub-Comm’n mtg. 416].
356. Id. at 5.
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extend to areas even outside a state’s territory where the state
exercised authority.357 Ferguson felt this change made the Convention
clearer and more precise.358 Jean-Marcel Bouquin agreed,
suggest[ing] that, in the interests of clarity and coherence, subparagraph (a) should be amended to read as follows: “Each State
Party shall abstain from any act or practice of racial discrimination
and undertakes that all public authorities and public institutions,
national and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation.”359

Calvocoressi accepted this amendment, believing that it would
also satisfy Ferguson.360 After several additional amendments that
made the draft more coherent and readable, the British and Italian
members revised their article.361 Article II’s final language declared:
1.

State Parties [to the present Convention] condemn racial
discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate
means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial
discrimination . . . in all its forms and promoting
understanding among all races, and, to this end:
(a) Each State Party undertakes to engage in no act or
practice of racial discrimination against persons,
groups of persons[,] or institutions and to ensure that
all public authorities and public institutions, national
and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation;
(b) Each State Party undertakes not to sponsor,
defend[,] or support racial discrimination by any
persons or organizations.362

Abram and Ferguson’s strategy worked brilliantly. Article II
appeared to offer a vision of a more active state, precisely what the
Eastern bloc had demanded. On the other hand, the Western bloc had
established a legislative record where they could credibly argue that
“public” referred to “state action.”

357. Id.
358. See id. at 4–5.
359. Id. at 6.
360. See id.
361. See id. at 6–14.
362. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 3, 660 U.N.T.S. at 216, 218.

LOVELACE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1910

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/16/2022 6:46 PM

[Vol. 71:1849

IV. CIVIL RIGHTS LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF HOPE
On January 30, 1964, Clyde Ferguson submitted a memorandum
to the State Department on behalf of both U.S. experts, analyzing each
article in the proposed treaty.363 He found that the draft Convention
was generally a considerable improvement from the Declaration in
draftsmanship and in the articulation of duties and obligations.364
Additionally, Abram and Ferguson were pleased to report that there
was substantial legislative history on the meaning and scope of critical
Convention terms such as “public.”365
The memorandum explained that Article I of the draft
Convention defined the term “racial discrimination.”366 Article I
prohibited racial discrimination in “political, economic, social, cultural
or any other field of public life”;367 Ferguson was concerned that this
provision raised some obvious constitutional and policy questions for
the United States.368 These same difficulties caused by the word
“public” recurred in Article II of the draft Convention. Ferguson’s
memorandum outlined how these Articles could raise major law and
policy problems for the United States since “each State undertakes to
eliminate racial discrimination practices by public authorities and
public institutions.”369 But the memorandum also outlined how
Ferguson and Abram had delineated the definition of “public” as used
in the article, defined as “the State and all its organs, and Statesupported or connected institutions.”370 Ferguson repeated, however
unartfully, the point: “That meaning, as is clear from the legislative
history, is clearly consistent with U.S. Constitutional Law.”371
But just as the lawyers had to work the Convention’s draft
language down to fit U.S. constitutional principles, so too did they have
to bolster constitutional obligations and principles to accord with those
imposed by the Convention. In the memorandum, the civil rights
lawyers thus turned to the sit-in cases—a series of Warren Court

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Comments by Dean Clyde Ferguson, Jr., supra note 183, at 1–4.
See id. at 1.
See id. at 2–3.
Id. at 2.
Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 69.
See Comments by Dean Clyde Ferguson, Jr., supra note 183, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.; see Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 70.
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decisions that redefined the state action doctrine—to justify their
position that Articles I and II of the draft Convention accorded with
the Constitution.372 The sit-ins transformed U.S. constitutional politics.
Activists fought over the future of U.S. constitutional law by making
constitutional claims with their bodies in racially segregated spaces. As
these protesters filled the air with songs that became the soundtrack to
the civil rights movement, they were simultaneously raising profound
legal questions over the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, the
potential reaches of the commerce power, and the scope of private
property rights.373
Ferguson justified his reading of “public life” by examining the
Court’s decision in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.374 In
Wilmington Parking Authority, William “Dutch” Burton, a Black city
councilman in Wilmington, Delaware, staged a sit-in at the Eagle
Coffee Shoppe, a racially segregated restaurant.375 The restaurant was
located in a parking garage owned and operated by the Wilmington
Parking Authority, a Delaware state agency, and the restaurant’s
operator was the Parking Authority’s lessee.376 Burton’s sit-in was far
from spontaneous. Burton and many of his constituents had longed to
challenge a state statute permitting racial discrimination in public
accommodations. Before staging the sit-in, Burton met with Louis
Redding, a Black graduate of Harvard Law who had risen to
international heights as the chief lawyer in the Delaware school
desegregation lawsuits consolidated into Brown v. Board of
Education.377 Redding urged Burton to challenge segregation by
attacking the private restaurant located in a publicly owned parking
garage.378 In Wilmington Parking Authority, the Warren Court held
that “when a State leases public property in the manner . . . shown . . .
372. See Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 70–71 (outlining the contributions of
three Warren Court decisions to the state action doctrine).
373. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 198, at 247–50 (describing local civil rights activists as
“[a]gents of [c]onstitutional [c]hange”).
374. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Comments by Dean Clyde
Ferguson, Jr., supra note 183, at 2–3.
375. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 716; ANNETTE WOOLARD-PROVINE,
INTEGRATING DELAWARE: THE REDDINGS OF WILMINGTON 122, 130 (2003).
376. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 716.
377. See WOOLARD-PROVINE, supra note 375, at 122, 130; Frank H. Hollis, My Memories of
Law Practice in Wilmington, Delaware, 16 DEL. L. 22, 26–27 (1998) (explaining the test case
strategy).
378. See Hollis, supra note 377.
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here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be
complied with by the lessee as certainly as though they were binding
covenants written into the agreement itself.”379 Ferguson asserted that
the Convention’s definition of racial discrimination was consistent with
these legal developments. The U.S. delegation had “clearly limited the
scope of the word ‘public’ to State action and State-supported
institutions along the lines of the Supreme Court decision in the
Wilmington Parking Authority Case.”380
Ferguson then turned to sit-in cases in Richmond, Virginia;
Savannah, Georgia; and Memphis, Tennessee, to buttress the experts’
argument that Article II conformed with U.S. constitutional law.381 In
three 1963 Supreme Court decisions, the Court had affirmed that “no
municipally owned and operated facilities may be segregated and no
unreasonable delay will be allowed in effectuating their
desegregation.”382 Each of the 1963 decisions extended the reach of the
Equal Protection Clause. In the Richmond case, Ford Johnson, a
student at Virginia Union University, the city’s historically Black
institution, staged a one-person protest to challenge segregated seating
in a Virginia courtroom.383 Johnson, a leader in the movement
sweeping campuses across the country, had already challenged
segregation outside of courtrooms.384 He felt compelled to confront
segregation inside of courtrooms too. The Warren Court overturned
the student’s conviction in short order, holding that “it is no longer
open to question that a State may not constitutionally require
segregation of public facilities.”385 Accordingly, Article II of the SubCommission’s draft, if ratified, Ferguson observed, would not impose
any new obligations on the U.S. government.386

379. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 726.
380. Comments by Dean Clyde Ferguson, Jr., supra note 183, at 2–3 (discussing Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715).
381. Id.; see Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 70–71.
382. Comments by Dean Clyde Ferguson, Jr., supra note 183, at 3; Ferguson, United Nations,
supra note 141, at 70–71.
383. See Negro Is Fined for Contempt in Traffic Court, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr.
28, 1962, at 4; 34 Are Arrested in Sitdowns Here, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 23, 1960, at 1.
384. 34 Are Arrested in Sitdowns Here, supra note 383.
385. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963).
386. See Comments by Dean Clyde Ferguson, Jr., supra note 183, at 3 (discussing Johnson,
373 U.S. 61 and stating that the scope of the term public is “clearly consistent with U.S.
Constitutional Law”).
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Wright v. Georgia387 similarly supported Ferguson and Abram’s
argument. In Savannah, six young Black men were arrested for playing
in Daffin Park, a gorgeous, fifty-acre city park surrounded by homes
with colonnaded front porches and racially restrictive covenants.388 The
“Savannah Six,” as they were known in civil rights circles, were
arrested and convicted of breaching the peace when they refused police
instructions to leave the park.389 The Court eventually overturned their
convictions.390 Article II’s prohibition on state-sponsored
discrimination accorded with Wright, Ferguson argued, because “in
Wright v. Georgia, the Court held that a municipality cannot arrest and
prosecute Negroes for peaceably seeking the use of city-owned and
operated recreational facilities.”391
And, in Memphis, Black college students teamed with local
leaders, like Maxine Smith, Benjamin Hooks, and Billy Kyles—
individuals who would later play starring roles in the Poor People’s
Campaign—to launch their own set of sit-in strikes.392 The city agreed
to desegregate municipal facilities, yet proceeded slowly and gradually,
citing the Court’s opinion in Brown II.393 However, in Watson v.
Memphis,394 the Court declared that Memphis must promptly
desegregate all municipal facilities. “The rights here asserted are, like
all such rights, present rights; they are not merely hopes to some future
enjoyment of some formalistic constitutional promise,” the Court
held.395 Ferguson’s use of the Memphis movement in U.S. diplomacy
vindicated the cries for “freedom now” in the Blues City.396 In the
387.
388.
389.

Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963).
Id. at 285.
Id. at 286; Georgia High Court Affirms Convictions of Savannah Six, ATLANTA DAILY
WORLD, Nov. 11, 1961, at 5.
390. Wright, 373 U.S. at 291–93.
391. Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 71 (footnote omitted) (citing Wright, 373
U.S. 284).
392. BOBBY L. LOVETT, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN TENNESSEE: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY 191–92 (2005).
393. See Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963) (describing the city’s delay in
ending discrimination against the petitioners).
394. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
395. Id. at 533. See generally Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 71 (relying on
Watson, 373 U.S. at 533).
396. Ferguson, United Nations, supra note 141, at 70–71. Ferguson maintained that “three
1963 decisions again reaffirmed that no municipally owned and operated facilities may be
segregated and no unreasonable delay will be allowed in effectuating their desegregation.” Id.
Watson was the third 1963 decision.
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process, the U.S. expert’s reading of the sit-in cases offered the Warren
Court newfound significance in the Cold War and gave the U.S.
government good reason to ratify the race treaty.
Ferguson’s memorandum to the State Department offered a final
legal argument. It would allow the United States to assert even greater
leadership in the Convention debates. Although Article II of the draft
Convention only targeted public discrimination, Congress had the
authority to enact legislation that would exceed its Article II duty.397
Thus, Congress could reach both public and private discrimination
through the Commerce Clause, so long as the subject of the
discriminatory instrumentality affected interstate commerce.398 This
was the same legal argument proponents of Title II of the Civil Rights
Act had endorsed. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, had
testified before the Senate Commerce Committee in favor of Title II.
Rusk declared that U.S. prestige abroad suffered due to the “treatment
of nonwhite diplomats and visitors to the United States” in the nation’s
public accommodations.399 Abram and Ferguson reasoned that if civil
rights law provided U.S. citizens with more legal protection than the
Convention offered others around the world, then the United States
could point to its constitutional revolution and remind foreign critics
of how exceptional it really was.
The State Department congratulated Abram and Ferguson for
effectively advancing U.S. interests during the Convention debates.
They had faced an uphill battle given the nation’s racial turmoil in 1963,
but a Bureau of International Organizations memorandum praised
their remarkable success during the Convention debates.400 Morris
Abram traveled back to Washington, D.C., following the SubCommission’s historic session to meet with Assistant Secretary of State
Harlan Cleveland about the “critical issues” in the draft Convention.401
397. Id. at 70 n.9 (“Under the commerce clause of the Constitution, public and private
discrimination could be reached as long as the subject of the instrumentality of discrimination
affected interstate commerce.”).
398. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (conferring upon Congress the right to regulate
interstate commerce).
399. Civil Rights: Public Accommodations, Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, 88th Cong. 283 (1963) (statement of Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State).
400. Letter from Morris Abram to Mrs. Ronald Tree (Jan. 2, 1964) (on file with MARBL,
Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 9); Memorandum from Joseph Sisco to William Stibravy (on file
with MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 9).
401. Suggested Agenda for Cleveland-Abram Consultation (Feb. 1964) (on file with
MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 9).
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The first two issues on their agenda were the “Definitions [of] ‘[r]acial
[d]iscrimination’—Article I” and the meaning of “‘Public’—Article I
and Article II (c).”402 By all accounts, the meeting went exceedingly
well. In fact, Abram and Ferguson’s strategy in the Sub-Commission
became the blueprint for U.S. delegates who continued the Convention
negotiations in the Commission on Human Rights, Third Committee,
and General Assembly.403 In the guidance papers issued to U.S.
representatives at each level of the treaty negotiations, State
Department officials repeated that they would support the SubCommission’s draft Convention, particularly in light of its legislative
history pertaining to discrimination and public life.404 The State
Department’s guidance papers emphasized that the draft Convention’s
discrimination definition clearly distinguished between public and
private activities.405 The memoranda directed U.S. representatives who
would continue to negotiate the treaty to avoid focusing on the phrase
but resist any other states’ attempts to eliminate the phrase in
negotiations.406 The guidance papers continued: “Should this limitation
be removed, the paragraph would be unacceptable since it would
require governmental action in areas of private conduct beyond the
reach of federal authority.”407
Although U.S. constitutional law and the experts’ guidance papers
might not have gone as far as some in the movement might have
wanted in January 1964, the experts felt at ease with their positions
because the definition of public discrimination was rapidly changing in
their favor. The Supreme Court, in particular, was finding new ways to
reach and end forms of racial segregation in areas once considered
private.408 Racial progress was often toilsome and always messy, yet the
gap between what the United States practiced and what it preached
was steadily closing. Abram and Ferguson had not only witnessed these
developments; they had been integral parts of that change. Never in
their lifetimes—and perhaps in the nation’s history—had so many

402. Id.
403. Position Paper, 20th Regular Session of the General Assembly (Aug. 5, 1965) (on file
with MARBL, Abram Papers, Box 94, Folder 9); U.S. Position on Articles Adopted, supra note
316, at 3–4.
404. U.S. Position on Articles Adopted, supra note 316, at 3–4.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 4.
408. See Ferguson, Jr., Civil Rights Legislation 1964, supra note 194, at 102, 108–11.
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Americans, Black and white, been so serious about forcing their
country to live up to its promises. The future was filled with hope from
the experts’ perspectives and that hope was well justified.
The U.S. experts, like many racial liberals during the midtwentieth century, read racial progress teleologically. Abram, for
example, believed that legislative malapportionment was a tool of
racial domination, and he was certain the Warren Court would make
this form of discrimination a “political dinosaur.”409 Ferguson, more
sober in expression but just as optimistic in outlook, believed that it
was “probable that the Supreme Court will go even further in
extending the application of the present meaning of state action.”410
Scholars, practitioners, and everyday people were forcing the United
States to reconsider the public–private divide.411 This constitutional
question was at the core of America’s racial crisis. In 1964, the Warren
Court’s civil rights jurisprudence appeared to project well for many
movement participants. Ferguson theorized several directions the
Court might take to expand the state action concept. The Court, for
example, could extend Shelley v. Kraemer412 to establish the principle
that “any slight participation by any state instrumentality in a
discriminatory scheme—no matter how limited that ‘participation’—is
unconstitutional action.”413 In private education, for example, “racial
classifications might be outlawed . . . [because] educational standards
are prescribed by the state.”414 A private corporation’s employment
policies using racial classifications might be struck down because the
corporation’s existence depends upon a state charter.415
Thus, the Court could extend the Fourteenth Amendment in the
same way that it had done with the Fifteenth Amendment in Smith v.
Allwright416—where any “statutory scheme so pervasive as to
substantially limit the area of operation of a private enterprise results

409.
410.

ABRAM, supra note 12, at 79, 104.
Ferguson, Jr., Civil Rights Legislation 1964, supra note 194, at 102, 107 (quoting
BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 93, at 265).
411. Id. at 102, 105–07.
412. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
413. Ferguson, Jr., Civil Rights Legislation 1964, supra note 194, at 107 (quoting BLAUSTEIN
& FERGUSON, JR., supra note 93, at 265).
414. Id. (quoting BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note 93, at 266).
415. See id.
416. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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in such enterprise becoming subject to the obligations of the state.”417
In this manner, the Court might tackle some forms of private racial
discrimination by regulating ostensibly private entities “clothed with a
public interest.”418 Ferguson noted that in Guillory v. Administrators of
Tulane University,419 Judge J. Skelly Wright, reviled as “Judas Scalawag
Wright” by New Orleans blue bloods and blue collars alike, had relied
on this logic to desegregate the Uptown campus two years earlier.420
And if Congress actually passed the pending civil rights bill, the Court
could easily uphold the legislation using the Interstate Commerce
Clause.421 Ferguson emphasized that the Justices were increasingly
issuing progressive civil rights opinions, and this development
“forecast[ed] the trend of future decisions,” a view that captured the
era’s liberal ethos.422
Morris Abram and Clyde Ferguson were far from alone in their
views. Leading legal thinkers of the 1960s were consumed with the
state action problem. Yale Law Professor Charles Black believed that
the state action issue was the most pressing functional and conceptual
issue in U.S. law.423 According to Black, “[t]he amenability of racial
injustice to national legal correction is inversely proportional to the
durability and scope of the state action ‘doctrine,’ and of the ways of
thinking to which it is linked.”424 Likewise, in A Century of Civil Rights,
Cornell Law Professor Milton Konvitz welded Shelley v. Kraemer’s
holding to an expansive reading of the Thirteenth Amendment as a
way to resolve the constitutional questions raised by the sit-ins.425
Konvitz argued that federal courts should apply the rationale of Shelley
to states if, by police and court action, states perpetuated the incidents

417. Ferguson, Jr., Civil Rights Legislation 1964, supra note 194, at 107.
418. Id. at 109 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876)).
419. Guillory v. Adm’rs of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 859 (E.D. La. 1962).
420. Id.; Michael S. Bernick, The Unusual Odyssey of J. Skelly Wright, 7 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 971, 972, 991 (1980) (describing Wright’s nickname and ostracism as well as his desegregation
decisions, including Guillory).
421. See Ferguson, Jr., Civil Rights Legislation 1964, supra note 194, at 115 (“Congress has
the unquestioned power to enact . . . legislation forbidding acts of racial discrimination in places
of public accommodation having a substantial effect upon interstate commerce.”).
422. See id. at 106.
423. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966 Term—Foreword: “State Action,” Equal
Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 69 (1967).
424. Id. at 70.
425. MILTON R. KONVITZ & THEODORE LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 151–52
(1961).
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and badges of slavery.426 Along the same lines, Theodore St. Antoine,
future law dean at the University of Michigan, offered his own
reformulation of the state action doctrine in an award-winning
article.427 St. Antoine found that application of the state action doctrine
could hinge on whether a private activity was invested with the public
interest and impaired Fourteenth Amendment rights.428 Although St.
Antoine recognized that his test would not cure all racism, his
“realistic” and “meaningful” reformulation of the state action doctrine
would be “no small gain” for “the millions fighting the battle for racial
equality in our day.”429 These scholars, like the U.S. experts, believed
that the Warren Court would soon recognize how dated and incoherent
the state action doctrine was for a modern democratic society, and the
Court would in turn narrow the public–private distinction.430
Other scholars went beyond the positions of Black, Konvitz, and
St. Antoine. They predicted that the Court would eventually reject the
state action requirement altogether in equal protection cases.
University of Texas Law Professor Jerre Williams published a heavily
cited law review article entitled, “The Twilight of State Action.”431 In
this article, Williams declared that Burton had opened the door for
abandoning the state action doctrine as decisive on constitutional
discrimination issues.432 Such a doctrinal shift for Williams would be
the natural course of events, since state action was now present in
virtually all cases.433 The racial teleology that flowed through civil rights
practice and the U.S. experts’ strategy also flowed through liberal
camps in the legal academy.434
426. Id.
427. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action,
Equal Protection, and “Private” Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REV. 993, 993 n. (1961)
(noting that the “paper was awarded the first prize in the 1960 Broomfield Essay Competition at
The University of Michigan”).
428. Id. at 1011, 1016.
429. Id. at 1016.
430. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505 (1985)
(acknowledging the “irrationality of current state action doctrines” and suggesting that a
“rethinking” was due).
431. Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347 (1963).
432. Id. at 382.
433. Id. at 389 (“The sun is setting on the concept of state action as a test for determining the
constitutional protections of individuals. . . . [S]tate action is so permeating that it is present in
virtually all cases.”).
434. See Chemerinsky, supra note 430, at 505. Chemerinsky aptly noted, “For twenty years,
scholars persuasively argued that the concept of state action never could be rationally or
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The U.S. experts’ strategy, moreover, offered racial liberals a way
to dignify a movement typically cast as “irresponsible.”435 Black
protesters, like the “Savannah Six,” had been denounced by
segregationists for shattering the image of the 230-year-old seaport city
lined with quaint cobblestone streets and lush squares of moss-laden
oaks.436 Then a century after General Sherman’s March to the Sea, the
State Department had used another siege of Savannah to help chart a
path for others around the world to follow. Placing the Savannah
protests within a larger narrative of U.S. progress rendered the
demonstrations as more constructive, more familiar, and more
American. Similarly, the State Department’s strategy lent greater
legitimacy to the tireless efforts of civil rights lawyers. The U.S. experts
and their colleagues—individuals like Constance Baker Motley,
Derrick Bell, and Louis Redding—had risked life and reputation for
representing allegedly “extremist” clients and causes.437 Yet, when the
principals in a legal relationship became more “respectable,” so did the
agents. The vibrancy of the civil rights movement was not a sign that
U.S. values were flawed. It instead symbolized citizens’ commitment to
perfecting the United States’ ideal.
The U.S. members felt genuine pride for their personal
accomplishments and for the nation’s ongoing march to freedom. “I
was keenly aware that I was representing the only great power that
stands for human rights,” Morris Abram remembered of his time on
the Sub-Commission.438 Clyde Ferguson considered his contribution to
the Convention as one of his signal achievements. In the spring of 1965,
Ferguson organized a Howard Law symposium on the Convention, and
the dean told the audience that the United States’ conception of rights

consistently applied. The inability to construct principled state action doctrines led many experts
to predict that the concept might completely vanish.” Id. (footnote omitted). See generally
Williams, supra note 431 (discussing the impact of the Civil Rights Cases on the modern
development of the state action doctrine).
435. See, e.g., Tear Gas Halts Negro March in Savannah, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1963, at 2, 9
(blaming the “irresponsible elements” for the racial violence).
436. See Homer Bigart, Savannah Is Tranquil, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1964, at 1; cf. Wright v.
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 285–86 (1963) (overturning Black petitioners’ convictions for breach of the
peace for peacefully playing basketball).
437. See, e.g., CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 184–85 (1999) (describing Motley and Bell’s legal advocacy for the NAACP);
see also WOOLARD-PROVINE, supra note 375, at 130–31 (discussing Louis Redding’s civil rights
practice and his association with the NAACP).
438. ABRAM, supra note 12, at 150–51.
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was broader then than at “any period within the last 100 years.”439 This
moment, for Ferguson, was indeed the second Reconstruction and the
third American Revolution. “[W]e are in the midst of a very definite
historical development in the United States which demonstrates that
our traditional conception of Civil Rights has been perceptively
broadened. This broadening over the last 5 years has moved at a very
very rapid pace.”440 Dean Ferguson, proud of Howard’s central role in
creating “the very revolution that we have now,” concluded, “I would
say that at the present time, what we generally understand to come
within the compass of human rights as used in the international
dialogue is roughly the same as Civil Rights as we use the term here in
the United States.”441
But a paradox remained. Two pioneering civil rights attorneys
advanced a reading of the Convention that circumscribed the treaty’s
definition of racial discrimination. Abram and Ferguson believed in
American exceptionalism and were willing to wager on U.S. racial
progress
over
time. They
expected
that their country
would eventually eviscerate both public and private discrimination,
then blaze a trail for the world to follow. Yet, the racial progress they
envisioned never arrived, and the state action problem they expected
to disappear never left.
CONCLUSION
Ironically, Abram and Ferguson recreated the state action
problem that so many people of color had hoped to overthrow. U.S.
race relations had improved dramatically in their lifetimes, and Abram
and Ferguson had been at the forefront of making the United States a
better version of itself. Still, the experts’ confidence that the nation
would overcome the state action problem—and many more racial
problems—allowed them to put the struggle for freedom on a
timetable. Three major lessons emerge from Abram and Ferguson’s
diplomacy during the Convention debates. In today’s renewed drive
toward racial justice and in an atmosphere of what might seem like
impending progress, activists and legal thinkers would do well to
remember them.

439.
440.
441.

Ferguson, Nature and Dimensions, supra note 23, at 452.
Id.
Id. at 452–53, 456–57.
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First, racial progress is never promised. Even though Abram and
Ferguson profoundly understood how the state action doctrine
hindered U.S. racial reform, they approached the state action doctrine
as a problem that would certainly be resolved in the near future. Here,
history has proven them—like many of the very best minds of their
generation—wrong. Racism, domestically and internationally, is
stubborn and persistent. In fact, racist backlash often follows racial
progress. Those who, like Abram and Ferguson, are privileged to have
an opportunity to change the course of law in antiracist ways must
understand that racial progress is never inevitable.
Second, well-intentioned and even racially progressive people can
perpetuate racial injustice. The U.S. State Department sent Abram and
Ferguson—a diverse team—to represent the United States at the SubCommission. Descriptive representation mattered in a way that it had
never mattered before in the State Department, and this was
particularly remarkable given the Department’s long history of
exclusion. Moreover, the State Department allowed and trusted
Abram and Ferguson to help lead a lawmaking process filled with great
geopolitical risk. These were no doubt social justice gains. Nonetheless,
Abram and Ferguson faced serious institutional constraints. Federal
officials would have never allowed the experts to export any legal
framework that did not accord with U.S. constitutional law. The
experts, however, as dutiful and ambitious attorneys, believed that they
could advance their racial interests while also advancing their nation’s
foreign policy interests. Their political calculus, to many at the time,
seemed sound. However, as this history reminds us, in the pursuit of
racial justice, it is often difficult to serve multiple masters.
Finally, this episode in the history of American diplomacy and
racial reckoning shows how delaying freedom now can mean delaying
freedom in the future. Policy windows for racial reform are often short.
Delay can be fatal for change. U.S. courts never interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause the way Abram, Ferguson, and many other racial
liberals anticipated.
Today, the U.S. government continues to rely on the public–
private distinction when deciding whether racial discrimination is
actionable. Because the U.S. government relied on a narrow reading of
the treaty when it ratified the Convention, ultimately entering a formal
reservation to this end, the public–private distinction remains
enshrined in both U.S. domestic and international law. Since the
Convention’s ratification, many U.S.-based, nongovernmental
organizations have submitted shadow reports to the U.N. Committee
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on the Elimination on Racial Discrimination—the Convention’s
monitoring body—detailing instances of discrimination that could
violate the Convention. The State Department, however, has found
these instances nonactionable, relying on a narrow reading of the
Convention and on the United States’ reservation. The State
Department has insisted that given that reading, the United States has
no treaty obligation to “prohibit and punish purely private conduct of
a nature generally held to lie beyond the proper scope of governmental
regulation under current U.S. law.”442
Surely, the contemporary authors of these shadow reports would
have never imagined that an attorney for Martin Luther King, Jr. and
the former dean of Howard Law gave the State Department the legal
arguments and legislative record to oppose modern calls for racial
justice. And surely, Abram and Ferguson would have never imagined
that their diplomacy would be used to defeat calls for racial justice a
half-century later.

442. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INITIAL REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2000), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/usdocs/cerdinitial.html [https://
perma.cc/3ARV-2S82].
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